THE NATION
1865 Centennial Year 1965
JUNE 28, 1965 . . 35c

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THE MISCHIEVOUS ROBERT WAGNER

James Desmond

Five Books on Asia

C. P. FitzGerald **James Tracy Crown**
Robert G. Wesson **Donald Davie**



The UN at Twenty

THE MALAISE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Anne Weill-Tuckerman

VISION OF A WORLD ECONOMY

Alexander Gabriel

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LETTERS

Death of the gorilla

Lot, France

Dear Sirs: I would appreciate your allowing me to supply an epilogue to my review, "On the Bestial Floor" [*The Nation*, Mar. 22]. In that notice, writing of George B. Schaller's *The Year of the Gorilla*, I referred to the fact that the mountain gorilla was in danger of extinction as a consequence of the ubiquitous anthropoid improvement which it is our fortune to be part of.

Recently a French journalist, René Puissesseau, has visited the area in which Mr. Schaller conducted his studies of the mountain gorilla in 1959 and 1960. M. Puissesseau (*France Soir*, May 26) called on the zoologist and hotel keeper Walter Baumgartel, one of the world's experts on the mountain gorilla and an important figure in *The Year of the Gorilla*, and learned from him that "the civilized young Africans had seen no practical merit in the gorillas." As a result, when independence had reached the Uganda, Ruanda-Urundi and the Congo, the grazing rights to the already severely restricted gorilla preserve had simply been handed over to the local herdsmen, whose cattle had destroyed, in the first six weeks, half of the vegetation necessary for the survival of this cumbersome, peaceable, vegetarian species.

As none of the three African nations made any further attempt to protect the gorillas, they have been hunted for the fun of it by any human being with the necessary equipment, and their numbers fell rapidly from 500 to between thirty and forty. A year and a half ago it seemed likely that there was only one group still alive, and it is reported that since then a leopard has much reduced, and perhaps completely eliminated, the remainder. . . . *W. S. Merwin*

'Us peasants'

Berkeley, Calif.

Dear Sirs: I find it hard to understand your comment about Prof. Robert Scalapino's talk during the recent nation-wide teach-in. [In an editorial of May 31, *The Nation* commended Professor Scalapino for his responsible defense of government policies in Vietnam and his respect for the views of his opponents.] Many of Professor Scalapino's older students remember how firm he was in his belief that the nationalist feelings of the peoples of Asia were patriotic, not "Peking-directed"; now he claims it is "internal aggression" directed, of course, from up there. His change was dramatically shown when he grabbed the microphone, without being asked, to help McGeorge Bundy who had got himself on a hook in trying to answer a girl's question in Wheeler Hall here, during an earlier debate. . . . She asked: "What is our government's attitude if the people of South Vietnam vote for a Communist government?" Bundy replied with a long historical critique on how no Communist government ever came into power by a vote, and sat down. She stood up and said, "Answer the question, please." Bundy stood up again and said that if such a thing should happen, "it would be under the most horrible pressure of the Communists," and started to sit down again, but the booing was so loud he said, finally, "I don't know." At *this* point, Professor Scalapino jumped up and said: "The peasants of Vietnam don't know who the Communists are, so how could they have an election?" Another professor remarked to me afterward, "I wonder what Scalapino thinks of all us peasants who voted for LBJ."

George Kauffman

Routine

London

Dear Sirs: Reports from Vietnam that napalm is dropped regularly on "Vietcong positions" euphemistically show that the United States is burning alive hundreds of Vietnamese as routine policy. I ask people to try to understand imaginatively what this means.

Bertrand Russell

Give a day's pay

New York City

Dear Sirs: Some of your readers will, I feel sure, be interested in Artists Civil Rights Assistance Fund, Inc. A nonprofit foundation, ACRAF was organized a few months ago by a group of performing artists, writers, photographers, painters and others in the arts interested in the civil rights movement. Tax-exempt recognition has been granted from the Internal Revenue Service. Participants (among them Saul Bellow, Philip Roth, Jules Feiffer) contribute one day's earnings to the organization, which in turn makes grants for community centers, community hospitals, medical facilities and services, legal representation and for voter-registration drives. Recent grants include $2,500 to the Albany, Ga., nursery school, and $6,000 for legal fees to attorneys representing 300 or more persons arrested in the state of Alabama because of their activities in the civil rights movement. Some 200 of these individuals were arrested for peaceful demonstration in Montgomery during the Selma-Montgomery march.

For further information write to: Artists Civil Rights Assistance Fund, Inc., 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010. *Mrs. Warren Miller, Executive Director*

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The UN As It Is

As an international forum and a hopeful force for peace, the League of Nations lasted less than twenty years. In 1938, after Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia and the impending defeat of the Loyalist government in Spain, the League was finished. An ominous parallel emerges. On June 26, the UN celebrates its twentieth anniversary. In more ways than one Vietnam is today's Spain. It is a proving ground for the world's foremost military power, with far more force at its disposal than all the Axis powers combined could boast in 1938. A large section of mankind is divided into two hostile groups. The UN is not moribund, as the League was after its twenty years of travail, but U Thant has warned that it could be drifting toward the status of a mere debating forum, that its position as the primary agency for maintaining peace and security has been seriously undermined.

Comment about the UN, as about the League before it, has consistently taken two extreme forms: fervent utopianism or die-hard disparagement. The utopians, expecting too much, have managed to cover up the inherent limitations of an international peacekeeping body in an era of perfervid nationalism. The die-hards, for their part, have diverted attention from the real accomplishments and the prospects of further success. In this issue *The Nation* has tried to see the UN as it is, to appraise its accomplishments without losing sight of its limitations. On the political side Anne Weill-Tuckerman, who has covered the UN since 1946, has avoided wishful overevaluations while showing that the organization is more than a forum (valuable as that is) and that it has real accomplishments to its credit (p. 690). In the economic and social field, Alexander Gabriel tells the chronically unreported story of the UN's remarkable work through its specialized agencies and commissions (p. 694). But it should be noted that similar, if lesser, achievements of the League did not suffice to save it.

A major structural weakness of the UN has handicapped it throughout its life. Acting in the fashion of nation-states since the rise of nationalism, its most powerful members have elected to ignore their Charter obligations whenever they felt it necessary to protect their vital interests, real or imaginary. The UN machinery has worked when there was a general will to make it work, as in Cyprus and the Sinai Peninsula. Nowhere have its failures been total, not even in the Congo. But it cannot do the impossible, and in this respect Americans have a special responsibility. The United States, which crippled the League by refusing to join it, is now flouting the UN Charter by an increasing propensity to apply power unilaterally. We have been by-passing the UN with conspicuous regularity ever since we realized that we could no longer command an automatic majority in the General Assembly. Yet the case for American support of the UN, even in terms of national advantage, has never been stronger than it is today. The UN provides a framework within which, as a great power with far-ranging interests, we might be able to exert American influence effectively in the economic and political spheres, and even in the military. As Mrs. Weill-Tuckerman points out, the "Third World" of the developing and deprived nations, including those of our own hemisphere, has severe economic problems. Instead of helping the UN to help these nations, we offer them arms without limit and with only one objective—they must "fight communism." No one can say positively that an attempt to base American power on the UN, working through it instead of plunging blindly into one military adventure after another, would succeed, but it would surely stand a better chance than the dead-end policies we are pursuing.

Johnson at San Francisco

The President has announced, with more advance notice than usual, that he is going to San Francisco for the UN anniversary. If this is to be a merely sentimental or ceremonial journey, Mr. Johnson might better spend his time in Washington or Johnson City. But there is some reason to hope that he has practical, even urgent, reasons for lending his presence at what may be the last occasion of its kind. The UN needs Mr. Johnson's help—needs it desperately—but, perhaps no less desperately, Mr. Johnson needs the help of the UN. As an astute political operator, he may realize as much; if he does not, one must conclude that his skill in domestic politics forsakes him in foreign affairs.

Mr. Johnson has the advertising man's faith in reiteration. He speaks everywhere, on all sorts of occasions, of his devotion to peace and his ardent desire to have everyone but the Vietcong join him at the conference table. Rather than treat with the primary enemy—the one who is slaughtering Americans and being slaughtered by them, together with a sizable increment of civilians—Mr. Johnson has set up a surrogate enemy, the North Vietnamese government, which he is trying to bomb into a reasonable frame of mind. Unless success comes soon, Mr. Johnson will find himself in an embarrassing position, both before the world and in domestic politics.

If negotiations do ensue and are to succeed, both

SUMMER SCHEDULE

During July and August, *The Nation* will appear on alternate weeks: issues will be dated July 5, July 19, Aug. 2, Aug. 16, and Aug. 30.

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sides, as Senator Fulbright has pointed out, must make *major* concessions. A single concession, major or minor, by Mr. Johnson will bring screams of sell-out from his momentary Republican allies; they are already testing the loud-speakers. But Mr. Johnson's alternative, a large-scale land war in Asia, will subject him to national—and international—denunciation as a warmonger. This dilemma is of Mr. Johnson's own making; the outcome of his evangelical words and violent deeds. The moral, if he wishes to draw it for his own future guidance, is that a public man cannot conceal indefinitely a gross disparity between what he says and what he does.

The UN celebration offers Mr. Johnson a way out. Except among a minority of disaffected rightists, the organization is popular among Americans. They see it as the hope of the future, if indeed there is to be hope. This general sentiment is reflected in the Senate's ratification of two amendments to the UN Charter designed to give greater representation of Afro-Asian countries in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Instead of the expected field day for Senatorial foes of the UN, only Senator Thurmond spoke in opposition, and he did not bother to vote. The vote was 71 to 0 for the amendments.

Mr. Johnson is a man who respects Senatorial unanimity, and perhaps this showing will give him courage to make a dramatic move at San Francisco. Senator Gruening has urged Mr. Johnson to use the occasion to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council to "revitalize the United Nations and to help solve our dilemma in Vietnam." Such action by the President, Mr. Gruening said, would restore to the UN its essential peace-keeping purpose and would be an honorable way out of the existing impasse. It would be a new beginning for the UN, and it would get Mr. Johnson off the hook. An American President's road is hard and his mistakes may be forgiven—up to a point. What will not be forgiven, by history in the long run and by the American people quite soon, is the passing up of a God-given opportunity to rectify a crucial and evident error.

The Shastri-Pearson Talks

Ottawa

It was hardly noticed by the American press, but the leader of one-seventh of mankind held intensive talks here with Prime Minister Lester Pearson on the Vietnam problem just as U.S. troops were about to be committed to combat. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India came to Canada on June 10, one year and one day after he succeeded Jawaharlal Nehru, and immediately set to work with Mr. Pearson to find a road leading to a cease-fire, negotiations and a guaranteed settlement.

The two Prime Ministers did not underestimate their task—nor the relative isolation of the Indian leader's first trip to North America. But the fact that it was sandwiched between his visits to Moscow and (after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London) to Algiers, gave significance to Mr. Shastri's five-day Canadian stay beyond his determination to show his people that he could cross the Atlantic without an invitation from Lyndon B. Johnson. As it happened, President Johnson sent a letter to Mr. Shastri in Ottawa by the hand of B. K. Nehru, India's Ambassador to the United States, renewing his invitation to visit in the fall. Mr. Nehru outlined U.S. policy on Vietnam to Mr. Shastri and, after returning to Washington for a call on the State Department, unexpectedly accompanied his Prime Minister to London.

So the Ottawa talks may have been an important link in the expanding dialogue leading toward a non-military solution in Vietnam. No one concerned expects such a solution until after the monsoon, if then. But one conclusion that can be drawn from the Shastri-Pearson talks is that Mr. Johnson will ignore the advice of almost his best friends and not quite his severest critics at the peril of losing what good will the United States still enjoys in the world.

While Canada cannot afford to be too openly hostile to the United States and India cannot afford to be too openly friendly, their positions on Vietnam are virtually the same. They agree, for example, that negotiations cannot start until U. S. bombings of North Vietnam stop, but only Mr. Shastri still says so publicly. Only he warned in an interview of the dangerous consequences that may flow from involvement of U.S. units with the Vietcong. He had in mind Chinese intervention, which he does not think likely under present conditions. But China, after all, is India's main enemy, and this puts the shoe on the other foot. Thus, Mr. Shastri was willing, in a vaguely worded joint communiqué, to recall the 1962 report of the International Control Commission in Vietnam, in which India and Canada, with Poland dissenting, squarely blamed Hanoi for violation of the 1954 Geneva accords. He foresees the day when the people of both North and South Vietnam will vote on reunification, but he is sympathetic, as is Mr. Pearson and much more loudly, to American attempts — within bounds — to contain Communist control until that day arrives.

Three ideas emerged for three different stages on the curving road toward a peaceful solution, and these have been conveyed to Washington. One is that the next time the United States decides on a pause in the bombings, it should say so beforehand and, preferably, not resume them. Another is Canadian External Affairs Minister Paul Martin's idea of letting the North Vietnamese include the National Liberation Front in their delegation at a peace conference, thus reconciling key conditions put up by Washington and Hanoi. Finally, and most important, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Shastri began exploring the idea of a strong international peace-keeping force to guarantee a settlement in Vietnam. Again displaying a realism of his own, the Indian leader indicated willingness to keep Indian troops out if China objected.

The proposals are modest, and perhaps India and

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Canada are too meek. But they are in a position to begin building the edifice of trust and mutual interest among a number of nations that will be necessary to prevent a growing war in Asia. Mr. Shastri may have it in him to be a conciliator of international disputes, as he has been of some of India's most unyielding conflicts, and in this he has found Mr. Pearson a valuable friend. But President Johnson will have to do more than write letters.

Middle-Class Litters

It seems odd that "free love" bears such a bad name, while free propagation is considered virtuous—so long as the couple is married. The attitude is a hangover from a time when high fertility was desirable, to make up for high infant mortality. American fertility decreased, however, during the 19th century, while population increased. Improved pediatrics was gradually taking hold, and so was birth control. Theodore Roosevelt's tirades against "race suicide" and similar exhortations to increase and multiply without limit were protests against a falling birth rate and slowing population increase. The low point was reached in the thirties, but the depression was only a transient factor in a secular trend.

Then, in a dramatic reversal, fertility returned rapidly to the level of 1897, against a death rate far lower. A continuation of this course could be devastating. That unchecked population growth is a critical American problem and not merely something for Asians, Africans or Latin Americans to worry about is clear from such publications as "Population Profile" by the Population Reference Bureau; "The Growth of U.S. Population" by a permanent committee on population of the National Academy of Sciences; the proceedings of the Planned Parenthood-World Population symposium, and many individual statements.

From these reports and discussions it appears that a "second-stage baby boom," which may be in prospect, would overload the environment and overtax school and recreational facilities even more drastically than the "explosion" we have recently been experiencing. The peak marriage years for women are now 18-21. Five years ago there were 4.7 million girls in this age group; now there are 6 million; in 1968 there will be 7 million. Young brides tend to have babies sooner—something like one-fourth are brides because they are already having babies. If, during the remainder of the sixties and the decade of the seventies, the rising numbers of potential childbearers should choose the 2-to-4-child family which was the vogue in the fifties, the outlook is for a U.S. population of nearly 400 million by the end of the century. Long before that level is reached, enormous difficulties in schooling, employment, medical care, etc., will be encountered.

However, since 1957, the fertility rate of women in the childbearing years (15-44) has declined and is now back to where it was in 1950. If this trend should continue, the problems of population increase will be of manageable magnitude. The crucial factor is whether middle-class couples will cut back their philoprogenitive urge from the three-child average to two. The large families of early America are no longer a requisite of population increase. With current mortality rates, population can get out of bounds with only three or four children per family. As Lincoln H. Day (School of Public Health, Harvard) points out, "the bearing of a large family can no longer be construed as a social contribution. In fact, if our rate of increase continues high, it will become necessary to be even blunter: by pointing out that those who elect to have more than two—or at the very most, three—children necessary for replacement, are indulging themselves at the expense of the rest of society."

It is a false impression that overpopulation results from the fecundity of the lower classes. Actually, the middle- and upper-income and educational groups are responsible for well over three-fourths of all American births; consequently, the birth rate among the poor has little effect on the total. Impoverished and low-income families average less than one child more per family than the prosperous. The underprivileged family itself is the chief sufferer for overproduction of children and its members are usually aware of the fact. Given contraceptive information and the means to use it, most of them would be no more guilty of irresponsible parenthood than their betters.

Polit Art

Last week's White House Festival of the Arts might well have been called "How to Attend the Johnsons' Garden Party Without Actually Endorsing the Escalation of War in Vietnam and the Intervention with Marines in Santo Domingo." Those who assembled in the Jacqueline Kennedy Garden, ate cold salmon in the East Garden Court of the National Gallery and gathered in various rooms of the White House to hear music, speeches, poetry and excerpts from plays, were evidently haunted by the suspicion that they were being used. And indeed it might seem to outside observers that they were right—that a politically astute President was using them as an aesthetic stick with which to beat an academic opposition.

The presence most keenly felt during the long day's uneasy festivities was that of Robert Lowell, who more than ten days earlier had declined the White House invitation on the ground that to be seen publicly hobnobbing with the Johnsons at this particular moment would inevitably commit him in some degree to Administration policies abroad. Mark Van Doren made the day's first reference to Mr. Lowell when he said that the poet's absence "may or may not have been correct," but that he mentioned it to honor "the scruples of a fine poet." Mr. Van Doren stated after his speech that he had received help in phrasing this somewhat ambiguous statement from John Hersey and Saul Bellow. Later in the day, Dwight Macdonald

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circulated a petition saying that the presence of the signers at the festival was not to be taken as a repudiation of Mr. Lowell or an endorsement of the President's Vietnam policy, but the company apparently felt that this only underlined the awkwardness of the situation, and Mr. Macdonald could get only six colleagues to join him. Mr. Hersey then continued the unofficial theme of the day by prefacing a reading from his *Hiroshima* with remarks warning against the small steps that lead to ultimate horror.

This elaborate celebration of the arts was initiated immediately after the National Teach-In, and pushed to completion under maximum pressure. The sense of urgency makes one wonder why the Johnsons decided that they could not let the month of June pass without demonstrating their enthusiasm for abstract sculpture, Pop art and the plays of Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller. The President, welcoming the distinguished visitors, said: "Your art is not a political weapon. Yet much of what you do is profoundly political." It was a remark not calculated to allay the qualms of the audience, at least some members of which only too clearly felt themselves out on a political limb.

The Mischievous Robert Wagner . . James Desmond

Whatever one says of Robert F. Wagner's withdrawal from the contest for Mayor of New York is bound to be an understatement—the political implications are so vast, on national, state and city levels, that anyone presuming to prophesy the future from the facts presently at hand risks a charge of fakery. However, some conclusions are inescapable even at this point. The first is that the White House, which quickly, if perhaps speciously, denied having urged Wagner to seek a fourth term, must surely intervene, because the power vacuum now existing in New York is politically dangerous. On the one hand, failure to unify the squabbling New York Democrats could lead to the election of Republican John V. Lindsay as mayor and confront President Johnson with an attractive, ambitious young man, styled on the John F. Kennedy lines, as the Republican Presidential candidate in 1968; on the other hand, the Democratic Party in New York could come under the control of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, and that would hardly please the President.

Yet the White House will have to move with extreme caution. Wagner's announcement came at a particularly delicate moment in the struggles within the local Democratic Party. The Mayor was reported to be within weeks of easing William McKeon out of his job as state chairman, and even closer to forcing the resignation of Assemblyman Stanley Steingut as Brooklyn leader. The outcome of both these maneuvers is now in doubt, for McKeon and Steingut, allied against the Mayor in the legislative leadership fight last winter, are not going to quit now unless another "strong man" shows up to oust them. And none of the possible successors to Wagner thus far mentioned has shown the potentialities or political grasp to take on his unfinished jobs. Nor can any likely designee claim anything approaching the secure power base from which Wagner operated.

The rapidity with which Wagner's own power erodes, now that he is a voluntary lame duck, will have a distinct bearing on the future in the state as well as the city. He still controls job and court appointments, but patronage is not so important at this particular stage and, since June 29 is the first day for filing nominating petitions for the September primary, most of the Democrats will have to choose up sides in the next few weeks. This will involve even the lowest level of officeholders because New York state employs "slate" voting in the primaries and the job seekers will have to try to line up the man they believe the likeliest winner early in the proceedings. This tight timetable makes solution of the problem inordinately complex. The state legislature to be elected in November for 1966, under federal court decree, will consist of 165 Assemblymen and sixty-five Senators, against the present 150 and fifty-seven (with one vacancy). But with the drawing of the new lines, many legislators will have to go into the primaries against colleagues, because their districts now overlap. This assures an abundance of primary fights.

The immediate effect will be to weaken still further the present Democratic legislative leaders, put in by Wagner with Republican votes, and never firmly in command. On the day of Wagner's withdrawal, certain of his legislative followers began expressing grave doubts about continuing to accept his leaders, although they had gone along loyally through the faction-torn session. Some defections are certain.

Also on the state level, the Wagner withdrawal could have profound repercussions on the political future of Governor Rockefeller. The Governor and the Mayor, although they denied a formal alliance, worked in close harmony all through the legislative session, with Rockefeller seeming always to assume that Wagner would run again. And, although he hailed the Republican designation of Lindsay for mayor, it is unlikely that the Governor, in his heart of hearts, really wants to see him win. For Lindsay as mayor would share control of the New York State Republican Party that Rockefeller has held alone since he won his big income-tax fight in 1959. Furthermore, Lindsay could give the final blow to whatever lingering hope the Governor has of getting the 1968 Presidential nomination.

Rockefeller has, nevertheless, a stake in seeing Lindsay make a good run. The Governor already is an announced candidate for re-election next year, and anything that improves the GOP position in New

James Desmond, a political writer for the New York Daily News, *is the author of* Nelson Rockefeller: A Political Biography *(Macmillan).*

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Klein

John V. Lindsay

York City will presumably work to his advantage. He has already pledged himself to do whatever Lindsay asks of him, and has released the Republican State Committee's research director, Harry O'Donnell, to work in Lindsay's headquarters on campaign publicity. Before the campaign ends, the state will probably grant leaves to politically sharp public-information officers of several departments to give Lindsay an assist.

It is very doubtful, even so, that Lindsay can make the grade. The departure of Wagner stirred instant enthusiasm among the Republican's boosters, but the advantage he gains by not having to oppose Wagner may be minimal. The Democrats have a registration edge of 3 to 1 in New York, and the folklore has it that more grandfathers go into the election booths with the voters in this city than anywhere else in the country. Moreover, the Democratic hold on minority groups has been solid since New Deal days, despite strenuous efforts, notably by Rockefeller in his two campaigns, to make inroads among the Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Talk of fusion backing for Lindsay is at best premature, at worst wishful thinking. For one thing, the "name" Democrats, who might have jumped to the Lindsay ticket, are now scrambling themselves for Democratic nomination to the top city spot. For another, the times simply aren't right. Historically, a fusion ticket has been possible in New York only after a shocking scandal such as the Seabury investigation that gave Fiorello LaGuardia his springboard. And LaGuardia had a lot more than fusion behind him. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had forced Jimmy Walker out as mayor the previous year, was in a bitter feud to wreck Tammany Hall and gave more than a little overt and covert support to LaGuardia. Political ferment was in the air. The New Deal brought hope to the forgotten people of the depression and they were in a mood to kick the rascals out. And Tammany helped by putting up a nonentity as its candidate, while Joseph V. McKee, as Recovery Party candidate, rolled up a smashing write-in vote. Add to that the fact that LaGuardia was a colorful, earthy man with whom the voters could easily identify, and you have the ingredients of a proper fusion effort.

None of these ingredients is available to Lindsay. There has been no major scandal; the White House certainly won't go to his aid, and his aristocratic good looks and intellectual bearing may easily work against him in this city where the voters "don't fight City Hall," but nonetheless like to feel it is their City Hall.

The Liberal Party—which talks vaguely of fusion if the Democrats do not give them the candidate (still unnamed) they want—is Lindsay's chief outside power base. But the value of the Liberals is doubtful. Despite their pretensions to holding the balance of power, they have prospered only when they supported Democrats. Furthermore, the membership is drawn largely from alienated Democrats and some old-line Socialist groups who joined the party in search of an avenue to power. In the elections of Johnson and the two Kennedys, it must be presumed, most Liberals would have voted Democratic no matter what the party did. A fusion effort is not entirely foreclosed, for Lindsay forces could unquestionably find a couple of well-known Democrats to join their side. The question is: could they find Democrats who could swing a significant number of votes? Just names wouldn't mean very much.

This sort of problem is not Lindsay's alone. Among the Democrats being mentioned to oppose him, none has substantial claim to an impressive personal following. True, Manhattan District Attorney Frank S. Hogan made a strong run against Kenneth B. Keating for Senator in 1958 on the star-crossed Harriman ticket, but he has been more or less on the political sidelines since. Furthermore, Hogan, although he had the backing of three out of five county leaders to run against William O'Dwyer in 1949, declined a primary contest. Whether at 63 he wants to take one on, only he knows. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., who bears a nostalgic

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name some Democrats would like to have at the head of the ticket, has had few New York ties since he was the only Democrat to lose when Averell Harriman was elected governor in 1954. He also has shown a disinclination for a primary fight. Among the others, City Council President Paul Screvane, who came up through the ranks of the Sanitation Department, can't claim a personal following. He has long been pointed out as the Mayor's heir apparent, but Wagner, who is holding back for the present, would have to get out and work hard for him. The Democrats are going to have it out in the primaries; that was assured when the West Side Reform Democratic Congressman William Fitts Ryan (who just dropped his middle name) announced himself as a candidate two days after Wagner's statement.

Why did Wagner choose just this time to bow out? An experienced politician, far more astute than he is sometimes credited with being, and a fiercely loyal Democrat, he walked out leaving some jobs undone and knowing exactly what turmoil lies ahead for his party. It hardly seems that caring for a couple of boys 21 and 19, who spend most of their time away at school, could be the sole reason. The answer to that question will probably emerge in the weeks ahead, and it too could affect the mayoralty race.

The UN at Twenty

The Malaise of Sovereignty . . Anne Weill-Tuckerman

As United Nations diplomats gather in San Francisco, birthplace of the UN Charter, to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the organization, one is reminded of Plato's allegory where chained prisoners in a cave watch shadows on the wall before them while the real objects, of which they are unaware, move in bright sunlight at their back. The biggest such "object" is, of course, the war in Vietnam, while at present most of the political work of the UN is a play of shadows.

Since the abortive session of the General Assembly last winter, a flurry of meetings at UN headquarters has crowded the daily agenda and the conference rooms. The Trade and Development Conference, the UN's newest organ, has been putting out many new limbs, but there has been activity also in the "traditional" and "political" Disarmament Commission (meeting for the first time since 1960), the Committee for Defining Aggression, where East-West issues were aired once again, and the Committee for Peace-Keeping Operations, which deals in the abstract with the essential function of the UN.

None of these meetings has made news. And they have not advanced the cause of peace because they suffer from severe anemia which can be overcome only by coming to grips with political realities. A notable exception is the Security Council, which has made an attempt to involve itself in the Dominican crisis. For most of last month, overriding the stubborn opposition of the United States, the Council forced open again and again the Pandora's box of Santo Domingo, which Washington would have liked to keep closed and in the sole custody of the OAS. While the U.S. Marines were being transformed into an inter-American force, the Security Council succeeded in establishing a United Nations "presence" in the Dominican Republic, which has already served as an impartial observer. The representative of the Secretary-General and of the Security Council, Jose Antonio Mayobre, may have more authority than other mediators in that country to appeal, if necessary, for further cease-fires, if not to enforce them. Thus the Council remained actively "seized" with the Dominican situation, and voted, with the sole abstention of the United States, against turning over its responsibility in the matter completely to the OAS. The OAS retains the main control over developments in the island, but the Council can be convened at any time to issue new instructions to its representative.

In this case, the Council had to give battle, for the sake of principle, to a regional organization that claimed prior jurisdiction over a local conflict. This is a key issue for the survival of the UN today and one which Secretary-General U Thant has made the core of recent warnings. U Thant did not choose to give a legalistic lecture on the matter, but it is clear, from his remarks (and from a careful reading of the Charter) that the respective limits of regional and UN actions are defined by the words "peaceful" on the one hand and "enforcement" on the other.

According to the Charter, regional organizations have a free hand to seek "peaceful settlements" of disputes, but an "enforcement" action on their part, with the exception of measures against an enemy state, requires prior authorization from the Security Council. "Peaceful settlement" is generally interpreted to mean mediation, conciliation, arbitration, etc. That the sending of a military force, especially one as large as was dispatched to the Dominican Republic, belongs in this category is at the very least open to question. (No U.S. force was sent to Guatemala or Panama when crises involving these countries were left by the Security Council entirely in the hands of the OAS.) Any military action has an "enforcement" connotation. U Thant has drawn attention to the dangerous precedent of regional organizations taking enforcement matters upon themselves:

> *If the Organization of American States is recognized as competent to take enforcement action in a particular country in its own region, then we have to admit that the Organization of African Unity is also*

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competent to take certain definitive action by way of enforcement in its region. The same considerations naturally apply to the League of Arab States, if the League decides to take certain enforcement action in its region.

In other words, if the sending of the Marines to the Dominican Republic and their later incorporation into an inter-American force is condoned by the UN, the world body should also accept an African military crusade against Tshombe, or against Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, or the Portuguese African colonies; and a new Arab holy war against Israel, no matter what the consequences for world peace.

The United States and the OAS have no monopoly on by-passing the UN in favor of regional organizations. The Organization of African Unity has claimed prior jurisdiction for itself in a number of conflicts, while SEATO was invoked for collective action against the Communists in Vietnam; and only when NATO proved incapable of policing the Cyprus conflict was the UN called in.

Are regional organizations, then, the main rivals of the UN today? Are they threatening to take from the international body its main *raison d'être*? The answer is no, for the current malaise of the UN has also attacked the regional organizations. The real objects behind the shadows in Plato's cave are individual nations.

Twenty years after the signing of the Charter, whose preamble states that "We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims," the ideal of internationalism has once again faded. Today, proud nations, rich and poor, old and new, again claim for themselves (if not always for others) a full measure of sovereignty that tolerates less and less interference in what they consider their vital interests. The regional organizations which flourished in the fifties (NATO, OAS, SEATO, CENTO) are sick—torn by political conflicts, or dominated by a major power. The Warsaw Pact is loosening; the Arab League admits its impotence; the second Bandung Conference, about to meet in Algiers, shows signs of devoting a large part of its attention to the Moscow-Peking rivalry. International organizations are ignored, by-passed or resented, in spite of solemn statements to the contrary.

This trend toward nationalism has also been deplored with anxiety by the Secretary-General, who warned the leaders of the world that "a further drift in this direction, if not arrested in time, will mark the close of a chapter of great expectations and the heralding of a new chapter in which the world organization will provide merely a debating forum and nothing else."

It may be, though, that the development of national policies is not such a radical change, and that to the sorrow of idealists of all political shades, the UN has really mirrored these forces since its inception. The provision for a veto in the Security Council rules was a recognition of this fact of life. However, when a settlement was genuinely sought, the UN furnished focus and machinery, sometimes on a grand scale. It would be less than fair, also, to deny the role played by the UN, through the pressure of public opinion, in de-fusing conflicts or initiating peaceful solutions.

It is, indeed, natural that the UN should have been employed to further national policies almost as soon as the guns of war fell silent. The organization is, after



Secretary-General U Thant

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all, primarily the sum of its members, a fact which the absence of Communist China makes all too noticeable. In the course of its lifetime—already longer by a year than that of the League of Nations—the UN echoed successively, and sometimes concurrently, two main themes of the postwar world. The first, coming almost immediately after the signing of the peace, was the cold war. Although it was waged by blocs rather than nations, the real protagonists of the cold war were Moscow and Washington, the weak European countries, both East and West, taking a back seat. In the real world, the cold war could not be won, and it gave way finally to the *détente*, mostly through the shock of the Cuban crisis. But in the UN it was won hands down by the United States, the climax being UN endorsement of and participation in the Korean War and the accumulation of Soviet vetoes, which demonstrated Russia's isolation.

The second theme has been decolonization, on which Washington and Moscow found themselves allied in their efforts to accelerate the liquidation of the European colonial empires. The decolonization period, when new countries came into the United Nations in large numbers, soon to make up more than half of its membership, was marked primarily by the crises of Suez and the Congo. The Suez crisis provoked a UN police action which would not have been possible without the acquiescence of the United States and the USSR; both wanted to demonstrate their solidarity with the newly independent nations and forced the evacuation of the British-French-Israeli forces from Egypt.

In the Congo operation, the UN also served both powers by crushing the Katanga secession of Moise Tshombe. But common interests stopped when the organization supported, as the central government of the Congo, a faction opposing also the Lumumba forces. The United States pressed for recognition of the Western-oriented Kasavubu regime, while the USSR damned the whole Congo operation and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. The U.S. later switched horses and backed Moise Tshombe against the successors of Lumumba.

The UN was useful to Washington's policy, and Washington, quite naturally, made use of it. But recent American emphasis on power, rather than ideology, runs contrary to the UN's stated creed and arouses criticism from large sectors of world opinion. In its present configuration, the UN would not promote—or even approve—present U.S. policy and, as a result, Washington has become lukewarm in its support and sponsorship of the United Nations. It will be difficult for President Johnson to present a different picture at the San Francisco commemorative session.

Russia has used, and continues to use, the UN as a propaganda forum—propaganda not to be confused with policy. Coming after Khrushchev's blasting postures for the benefit of the new nations, the present Kremlin team is daily denouncing United States actions in Vietnam and Santo Domingo, mostly for the ears of Peking. But Moscow is using the UN primarily for its nuisance value and has made no attempt to have it deal seriously with either problem.

The newly independent countries of Asia and Africa have also used the United Nations, perhaps more than any other group, to promote their independence and their acceptance as a political factor. Their combined efforts have certainly played a crucial role toward that end, since the time when, in 1949, a Western plan to partition the former Italian colony of Libya into three Western-sponsored territories was frustrated by the General Assembly. However, the decolonization process being almost completed, with the exception of the southern part of Africa, the active support these nations have given the UN is also weakening in favor of national or at most regional policies. Asian nations, outnumbered in the UN by the Africans, see their national interests best served by bilateral aid programs. Thus, the Afro-Asian group, once so influential in the lobbies on the East River, is now practically nonexistent as a political force. The group chose not to force a showdown when the General Assembly became paralyzed as a result of the U.S.-USSR dispute on peace-keeping finances.

Instead, a new bloc is emerging with utmost vigor and bent on economic rather than political goals. This group, making an impressive seventy-seven, is composed of the developing countries, not only of Africa and Asia, but also of Latin America—almost the whole southern part of our planet. The French, weary of the East-West division into two-power camps, have given the name of Third World to this area.

Through its relations with the Third World countries, France is experiencing a rebirth at the UN; and one could almost say that it is experimenting with its own national policy on a new stage. France, which for so long was the target of UN criticism, first during the Algerian War, then for a policy of abstention and lack of interest, if not downright hostility, has lately performed very actively in UN debates as an exponent of political independence and often at the expense of the United States. This attitude, which frequently takes the form of defending juridical principles, has proved very attractive to the countries of the Third World. The formula offers them a sense of achievement, together with a feeling of national dignity. It is no coincidence that U Thant, a Burmese, often finds himself these days in agreement with General de Gaulle, although the French President's policy is avowedly based on the "nation-state" and seeks influence by way of inspiration and example, not by international action. President Johnson's policy, cloaked under the banner of anti-communism, is no less nationalistic than de Gaulle's. The good luck of France today is that it is no longer involved in military ventures, a situation which makes nationalism more respectable.

The present favorable position of France at the UN has had the side effect that its rigid stand on the peace-keeping and financial issues has met with more comprehension than the similar position of the USSR. The French rejection of any compromise on this issue has further removed the possibility that Article 19 will be raised again in connection with past UN peace-keeping operations. Article 19, for all practical purposes, is dead. The President of the General Assembly himself, Alex Quaison-Sackey, thus interpreted the unanimous wish of the peace-keeping committee to see the Assembly resume its normal procedure next September.

The whole peace-keeping issue, which seemed so ominous six months ago, has in fact lost its acute character, although there is no denying that its ultimate solution, or lack thereof, will play a large part in shaping the future role of the UN. The urgency is re-

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tained only in connection with a return to UN solvency. That, it is hoped, will be achieved, at least partly, once the pressure of Article 19 has been removed and "voluntary" contributions can be made without loss of face or principle.

As for how to initiate, organize, control and finance future UN peace-keeping operations, this is a project which may for a long time divide the partisans (principally the United States and Great Britain) of a dynamic and evolutionary concept of the San Francisco body, and those who demand a strict interpretation of treaties and consequently "a return to the Charter" (particularly by France and the Soviet Union). A probable result is that the General Assembly will not enjoy in future the vast powers exerted for more than ten years, and that the prerogatives of the Security Council will be firmed up. Will Communist China come into the UN in time to participate in this grand debate? Will the present government of mainland China honor the commitments to the Charter entered into by Chiang Kai-shek? These hypothetical questions fall under the heading of idle "peace games," together with schemes for Charter revision. For the moment, Peking does not seem interested in joining the UN, nor does it appear eager to promote the example set by Indonesia's withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the original character of the Charter, and especially of the Security Council, is being modified for the first time with the expected enlargement of the Council's membership, already accepted by the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France, with the Republic of China to follow in a few days. This development will please the new countries, especially the Africans, to whom it will give a representation in the UN councils more in proportion to their numerical strength, but it will reduce somewhat the power of the permanent members. As a result, they may be even more reluctant than before to bring to the Council issues they consider vital.

This does not mean that the UN will gradually fade away as an instrument of international cooperation or indeed of peace keeping. One may no longer be able to say that "every dispute eventually comes before the UN," as was the case for many years. Vietnam started a trend in the other direction, and one can state with conviction that the continuation of the war in Southeast Asia paralyzes all efforts toward a further lessening of international tension.

Punch: Ben Roth Agency

But secondary conflicts, of the order of Cyprus, Kashmir or Palestine, may well come again before the UN. The machinery is there, and U Thant recently urged the nations of the world to make use of it by bringing their problems to the organization as a "harmonizing center." Some governments will always find it advantageous to place certain issues before the world body, and there may be again a switch from brinkmanship to negotiation. Moreover, the UN retains its unique value as a diplomatic meeting place par excellence. The present Secretary-General has committed himself, as he is authorized by the Charter, "to take an initiative, no matter what the consequences to him or his office may be, if he sincerely believes that it might mean the difference between peace and war," but he will not make idle gestures which would only prove embarrassing to him and the organization. He will continue his diplomatic proddings, but he is not likely to take on the mantle of Dag Hammarskjold, whose almost mystic love of principles and abstractions gradually carried him away from reality and ultimately to his death—and indirectly plunged the UN into a financial abyss with the overambitious Congo venture.

U Thant senses that for the moment the way back to reality, away from shadow play and frustration, is for the UN to give priority — above strictly political issues — to the economic struggle between the haves and the have-nots. "In over two-thirds of the world today," he

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remarked, "most of the people do not have enough to eat. . . . I think that to preach to them the virtues of democracy . . . is not only irrelevant, but comic. . . . The remedy is to do away with these causes of illiteracy, ignorance, disease and poverty. I think that we have to go to the root of the problem if we are to establish a stable world order, if we are to see that the principles of the United Nations Charter are implemented in all parts of the world."

The tremendous activity of the UN in the "trade and development" field, even though it has not yet had time to yield concrete results, mirrors this preoccupation. That is the direction in which nations may yet find a common interest and a common field of endeavor.

Vision of a World Economy

Alexander Gabriel

In the UN house of differences, one view is maintained with steadfast unanimity. Statesmen and officials alike deplore the neglect by the international press of the vast economic operations of the world organization. The work of the UN in the current economic revolution was well summed up before a Congressional committee recently by Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "In point of fact, the peace and security matters which pre-empt our time, thoughts and energies, are but a small fraction of the United Nations at work. Almost seventeen of every twenty UN employees and nearly ninety-three cents of every UN dollar are engaged in economic, social and technical enterprises."

If the press fails to reflect this emphasis it is because a revolution in the Dominican Republic is more easily grasped than the abstraction of a world revolution, and guns at high noon in Vietnam are far more exciting than statistics in UN documents. So while a new world is being born, reporters focus their stories on the power struggle for the job of who should be the midwife.

But the trouble is not solely with the myopia of the press. It lies also in the lag between an old terminology and the science of a new world revolution. We are hardly aware of the violent shift that fast-moving developments have wrought upon the conventional political-economic spectrum. Much of yesterday's political strategy is today scientific, as the disarmament experts have discovered, and the conventional economic issues have attained a sharp political intensity.

President Johnson underscored this realignment when he offered to hitch his Vietnam war wagon to the Mekong River star. As it happens, this multi-nation project really got under way after the 1954 Geneva accord created a climate favorable to its chance of success. It is therefore doubtful, to put it mildly, that the converse will work, and that the Mekong will create a more favorable climate for ending the war. The revealing fact is that the President had to turn to a purely economic project in order to propose a solution to a knotty political problem.

The name Mekong sends a thrill through the entire UN family, for it embodies fully the organization's bold initiatives and growing aspirations for the solution of underdevelopment in terms of whole regions. The idea of taming this wild 2,625-mile water dragon for the benefit of all of Indo-China is the brain child of the Flood Control Bureau of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The preliminary surveys of its potentials for irrigation, flood control, hydroelectric power and navigation converted the original "dream document" into a charter of hope for the four riparian states — Laos, Cambodia, North Thailand and South Vietnam—which are supplying 45 per cent of the original kitty.

The Mekong project has a long way to go, but for the 17 million people involved success is already forecast in the five dam and power projects on the tributaries, two of which will be completed this year; in the pilot projects which prove that irrigation, which now waters only 3 per cent of the rice cultivation, can quadruple the crop dependent on rain water; in the discovery of bauxite for an aluminum industry in Cambodia and of rock salt deposits for industrial chemicals in Thailand.

The faith of these countries is matched by twenty-one contributing countries which are participating in a cooperative that only an international organization can bring together in a spirit of unmatched good will. It cuts across the legacy of suspicion among recently colonial peoples, and enjoys an immunity even from the expanding forces of war.

The Mekong is more than a project: it involves the total UN economic machine, just as a major battle enlists a nation's total war effort. To initiate even the conception of it required the combined talents of the UN's specialized agencies, its technical assistance apparatus and its financial structure. Financial circles know that UN planning is sound and realistic when it aims for seemingly utopian goals; that the utopias of the 19th century have become the commercial ventures—and very profitable ventures—of today.

Too frequently the UN's economic efforts are put forward in an attempt to offset its alleged political shortcomings. This defensiveness completely disregards the vision of its founders, who laid down the economic doctrine of ultimate peace. From the first lines of the Charter's preamble to its various provisions defining the functions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the promotion of better standards of life for all peoples through international cooperation is established as a condition for world stability and "for peaceful and friendly relations among nations." The economics of peace is an integral part of UN ideology.

The technical assistance program is not, as is frequently stated, the brain child of a few bright delegations, but the implementation of a provision that the UN may perform services "at the request of member states." The demand for disarmament as the road to economic growth is not mere Communist propaganda; it stems from a Char-

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ter provision which speaks of the establishment of peace "with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." The United States has reversed the process and made arms production such a big factor in its booming economy that it must now measure carefully "the economic consequences of disarmament," but that does not revoke the Charter imperative.

Similarly, the battle of developing peoples against the exclusiveness of some of the common markets stems from the democratic principles in the Charter which demand that all economic programs take account "of the rest of the world." The concept of economic equality is now being translated into a code of rights in one of the two draft covenants on human rights. The stupendous UN economic structure is firmly rooted in the principles of the Charter, which has become the Bible and world law for 2 billion underprivileged people in the developing areas.

The structure of the UN economic system, built up over a period of twenty years, is a partnership among the General Assembly, which adopts policy decisions; the Economic and Social Council, which implements them, and the sixteen specialized agencies, which are theoretically autonomous, but in fact fully cooperate with UN policies and directives.

Initially wedded to their own specialties, the agencies have been pulled into the economic field by the magnetic force of the Decade of Development program and the growing crisis confronting the developing economies. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is giving more emhasis to problems of management and productivity; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has shifted attention to agricultural planning and land reform; the World Health Organization (WHO) is now concentrating on national health plans related to the total national economy, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is pushing its literacy and vocational programs so close to economic problems as to have established working agreements with the World Bank group.

The UN bank constellation consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its two satellites, the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IDA was created in response to a clamor for long-term, low-cost, even interest-free credits; the IFC joins in actual partnership with private enterprises in individual countries to expand promising economic ventures and to strengthen local capital markets. Jointly, they advanced last year $4.4 billion to 134 countries (this figure, however, includes some overlapping of countries that were served by both organizations). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to augment its pool of reserve currencies to cover nations against foreign-exchange deficits and shortages—an important service when in 1963 the volume of world trade rose by a phenomenal 11 per cent to a record value of $170 billion. Under the new economic pressures, the four financial agencies are now moving to underwrite social and educational projects (which have shifted to economic in the new spectrum).

The economic swing-over is also evident in the other specialized agencies. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has plans to by-pass the railroad age with a Pan-African transport system. The World Meteorological Organization is tapping for water resources to redeem arid zones and to create new living space for expanding populations. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is becoming more sensitive to the trading demands of the new nations. Even the Children's Fund has moved a long way from the milk bottle, and is now promoting vocational training of youth in programs hinged to national economic planning. Pressed by the great hunger for more energy, the 1964 Conference on Atomic Energy sketched out a more promising future for competitive atomic power and nuclear reactors for the underdeveloped nations, which may never have an age of coal and oil.

The UN economic structure is spreading into a horizontal network across the globe, with its centers in the four regional economic commissions, in Europe, in Asia, in Latin America and in Africa. Each commission is itself a self-contained network, with committees on commerce, industrial development, navigation, tourism, etc. A staggering project of the Asia Commission is the 34,300-mile highway stretching from Burma to the edge of Europe. Alexander the Great did not require such roads to penetrate India, but then he really never presided over a one-world. The Romans, who did, discovered the advantage of unbroken communications. You can gauge the speed of development in the new African Commission from the 1964



New Scientist

Asian Highway Now Nearing Completion

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Conference on Industrial Coordination, which listed iron and steel, chemicals and common markets on its agenda. In less than three years the Africans scored a major triumph by establishing a Development Bank to match the one in Latin America.

The request by the Africans for "a complete inventory" of the natural resources of the entire continent is typical of their faith in the functional commissions of ECOSOC — the Social, the Population, the Statistical, the Commodity Trade, the Transport and the Commission on the Status of Women, with its own drive for economic equality. Literally probing new economic potentials from the ground up are the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning and the Committee on Space Research. The Scientific Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology are attached directly to the office of the Secretary-General, as outgrowths of the UN World Conference on Science and Technology.

It is impossible as yet to estimate the enormous contributions the recent UN world conferences have made to the gigantic concept of a world economy. Some observers despair that such unity can ever be attained, but these conferences soared on clouds of optimism which time may justify. The Oceanography Conference, the World Food Conference and the recent 124-nation Conference on Trade and Development brought together thousands of experts whose findings and conclusions are now the textbooks of the member states, the guidelines for developing nations. Furthermore, they have created a fellowship of scholars and thinkers that can be the cornerstone of an evolving world community.

They have also given tremendous lift to the members of the international civil service who preside over those vast projects. The technical assistance services, which symbolize the UN at its best, have installed hundreds of projects; 20,000 experts, augmented by 35,000 scholarships and fellowships, are serving more than 125 nations. The effectiveness of this aid can already be seen in the fact that half of the countries now receiving technical aid have themselves become suppliers of techniques to other countries; it is a chain reaction of ungaugeable potentiality. Between them, the expanded technical assistance program and the pre-investment Special Fund have planted 941 projects; these are supported entirely by voluntary contributions, and they have accomplished this work with a yearly joint budget far less than the $150 million they still hope some day to get. This, of course, is a pittance compared to the billions distributed by the big powers for their own purposes. But these projects are more effective catalysts, free from political pressures, closer to the UN planning and projections and to its mountain of literature expounding the soundest principles of national growth. Special Fund Director Paul Hoffman never tires of counseling that more of the aid now given bilaterally should be channeled through the United Nations "nonpolitical" program. For the receiving nations this is probably the best solution to the crises of power rivalry and an eventual path to real disarmament and peace.

Unfortunately, the Western powers do not accept this concept, and are even moving in the opposite direction, unembarrassed by the ratio of the small rehabilitation billions to the staggering world outlay of $125 billion in annual armaments expenditures, and deaf to the grave warnings of the consequences contained in UN prognoses. The dangers are in the widening gap between the have and have-not nations, in the North-South confrontation which is beginning to overshadow the perils of the East-West tensions. Despite the combined efforts of the UN and the great contributions of the big powers, the mid-point of the Development Decade finds the gap still widening under an expanding population which will bring the world's total to 4.3 billion by 1980, with 3.1 billion in the developing areas. Because of a consistent drop in their export prices, the indebtedness on foreign aid of only thirty-seven countries soared from $7 billion in 1950 to $18 billion by 1962 and is still rising. These countries are in a trap peculiar to an underdeveloped economy which is short of an internal capital structure and which adds to that shortage as prices of its exports fall and the costs of its imports rise. How can they break out, except by the revolutionary upheavals which are already becoming the "wars of liberation"?

For the time being their hope lies in a frantic build-up of the UN, where their organized majority is the sole bargaining power they can exert on the world. In the May session of the thirty-nation Committee for Industrial Development, they greatly broadened the scope of this department in the secretariat to give them technical guidance in every phase of manufacturing and processing, including heavy industries. Perhaps their greatest victory was scored in the UN Conference on Trade and Development. The Western powers were compelled to accept a set of principles which are bound to change world commerce from a trading system based on advantage to one based on economic equality and justice. It will take years to convert these principles into agreements, but the machinery has been set up in a fifty-five-nation Trade and Development Board with standing committees on Commodities, Manufacture, Invisibles and Financing, and Shipping. Operating directly under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly and with a secretariat of its own, this new setup adds a vital organ to the already impressive economic structure of the organization.

The struggle is essentially between the newly liberated peoples and the first-born children of the first industrial revolution. It transcends by far the scope and character of the Communist-capitalist confrontation. In the new struggle there is no clash of fundamental principles. Here the Communist and free world leaders speak the same language. If the Western states are dragging their feet it is because for them to accept fully the implications of the changes would involve a revolution in their own economies, certainly in their own thinking. If the Communist states back this transformation, it is because they have already gone through similar revolutions.

As the historian Toynbee points out, as far as we know this is the first time that such a vast economic revolution affecting the entire globe has taken place. In the UN economic machinery it is apparent that a new structure of world cooperation is emerging. Some new resolutions are in order for this badly begun International Cooperation Year —and principally the resolution to strengthen the UN in the one field where it has demonstrated enterprise and excellence.

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Medicare: The Major Defects . . . Frank van Dyke

The medicare bill now moving through Congress toward almost certain passage goes far beyond the relatively uncomplicated ideas of the original King-Anderson bills that failed in previous sessions. As is perhaps inevitable in so complex a piece of legislation, the proposed law contains many defects of detail; there are, however, several major flaws which, unless corrected, will adversely affect the cost and quality of medical care and unnecessarily increase the burden on the taxpayer. There is still time to amend the bill in these essentials: it has passed the House, but is at present in the Senate Finance Committee and will be reported out to the floor for debate sometime after July 1.

The three major sections of the bill deal with social insurance, through the social security system, for hospital and nursing-home care of persons over age 65; voluntary insurance, subsidized from general revenue, for physicians' care of persons over age 65; and an expanded version of the existing Kerr-Mills law that provides grants in aid to state welfare departments for the hospital and medical care of the medically indigent. Part A, hospital insurance for the aged, is financed by increased social security deductions. The benefits include sixty days of hospital care for each illness (the patient pays the first $40), limited care in nursing homes, some home care and outpatient diagnosis (after the first $20). The Senate Finance Committee has made several minor changes in this pattern, but benefits are still limited and many people believe they should be increased. However, experience with other medical-care programs is that benefits tend to increase after the program has been operating for a time, and benefits are not what is wrong with this section of the bill.

One of the principal defects in Part A is the exclusion of radiologists, pathologists, anesthesiologists and physiatrists from payment under the hospital section of the bill. This means that a hospital patient needing any of these four medical specialties will be billed separately by the institution for the service component, and by the physician for his professional service or supervision. These medical specialists are in some instances still private entrepreneurs, but increasingly they have either become hospital employees or have made contractual arrangements with hospitals. While the physiatrist is needed infrequently by patients, the other three specialties are a regular part of diagnosis or treatment. Nearly every hospital patient has an X ray and some laboratory tests; thus, a medicare patient could receive at least three and possibly five separate doctors' bills (including one from his personal physician) after hospital discharge. The procedure will increase the cost of a hospital admission for almost everyone.

The American Hospital Association, among other groups, has asked the Senate to restore the specialist payments to the regular hospital bill. If this is not done, it believes that these doctors will break away from the hospitals, and that the contemporary concept of the hospital as an organized complex of professional skills and services will be replaced by an institution that provides bed and board. The fear is not groundless. Medicare, when in full operation, will pay for about 20 per cent of all general hospital days, and the provisions of this proposed act will do much to shape the hospital of the future. Sen. Paul Douglas (D., Ill.) has introduced an amendment, adopted by the Senate Finance Committee, to make these specialist hospital services a part of the overall bill in those hospitals which employ or contract with doctors.

Another important weakness in Part A of the bill is the lack of federal authority over the quality of hospital care our older citizens will receive. The bill now clearly states that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in determining which hospitals may participate under the program, shall impose ". . . such other requirements as the Secretary finds necessary in the interests of the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services in the institution, except that *such other requirements may not be higher than the comparable requirements prescribed for the accreditation of hospitals by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals.*" (Italics supplied.)

The Joint Commission referred to in HR 6675 is a private organization of those who provide the services (physicians and hospitals). Its twenty members are made up of seven each from the American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association, and three each from the American College of Surgeons and the American College of Physicians. The government of the United States should not turn over to a private body the power to establish standards or specifications. There is no clear precedent for doing so. In purchasing any commodity or service, the government now issues its own specifications and standards.

An exception to the rule would be even more serious in this instance because the standards of the Joint Commission are minimal. Criteria for accreditation have necessarily been made general and inclusive enough to accommodate hospitals of varying sizes and complexity. It is wrong to assume that patients can be assured satisfactory care solely because they are hospitalized in an accredited hospital. Dr. Ray E. Trussell, Commissioner of Hospitals in New York City, has recently stated: "The Joint Commission has accomplished much, but maintaining the quality of medical care is a very small component of its efforts as yet."

In this connection, it might be noted that Dr. Trussell has promulgated a hospital code for the proprietary hospitals of New York City which goes much beyond the Joint Commission standards in the crucial area of medical care. For example, no physician other than a qualified specialist may perform major surgery in a proprietary hospital in New York. It is difficult to set national standards for hospital care, but the minimal of the Joint Commission should not be employed as a ceiling for the medicare program. At most, these standards should be a floor upon which the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the state health departments might build. This new legislation should encourage officials and agencies to improve hos-

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pital standards. Freezing them at the level of the Joint Commission on Accreditation is hardly the best way to achieve these goals.

What is needed, in this instance and in other sections of the bill, is discretion for the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to establish minimum standards of care based upon accepted current levels of medical knowledge. In effect, this has been done in several other federal medical-care pro-



grams, among them the Veterans Administration and the Children's Bureau program of grants in aid to the states for services to physically handicapped children.

There are various opinions as to how the hospital section of the bill should be administered. The Blue Cross plans and the insurance companies would like to handle the hospital section of the bill with as little federal direction as possible. Blue Cross and the insurance companies have done a great deal to advance better hospital insurance coverage for the American public. However, the several hundred insurance companies which write hospital insurance merely pay indemnities to individuals or hospitals when a claim is incurred. Except in exceptional circumstances, they have no experience in dealing with hospitals about important problems of length of stay, admission rates, unnecessary procedures or excessive costs.

Blue Cross plans are nonprofit organizations indirectly controlled by the hospitals through the Blue Cross boards of directors and loosely supervised with varying effectiveness by the departments of insurance in the various states and Puerto Rico. Attempts by several states to make the Blue Cross plans more responsive to public interests have been only partially successful. In many areas, Blue Cross is purely an indemnity, nonprofit insurance company.

There can be no objection to the federal government's dealing with the Blue Cross Association or the American Hospital Association as representatives of hospitals. It may even be desirable, as in the program administered by the Department of Defense for hospital and medical care of servicemen's dependents, to ask Blue Cross or insurance companies to be the fiscal agent in making payments to hospitals. It would be a serious mistake, however, to turn over to Blue Cross or to any nongovernmental agency the tasks of standard setting, hospital inspection, rate making or utilization controls. The cooperation of the hospitals and their agents, such as Blue Cross, with the government is desirable and necessary, but the program should not be turned over to them. The bill ought to be specific on this matter.

Part B of the bill displays even greater inroads upon the principle of public responsibility for the use of public funds. Under the voluntary plan outlined in this section, a beneficiary who wants coverage would pay $3 a month, and the government would supplement this with $3 a month from general revenue. Benefits would cover doctor bills, additional home nursing and up to sixty days for inpatient psychiatric hospital care. The patient would pay the first $50 each year and 20 per cent of the remainder of the bills. As in Part A of the bill, the Senate Finance Committee has suggested minor changes in these benefits.

As drafted, Part B is ambiguous on the very important issue of payments to physicians. It now reads that doctors must charge reasonably and no more than the rates prevailing in the community. The bill also requires that "to the extent possible" Part B shall be administered by insurance companies, commercial or Blue Shield. The insurance company, thus, will set the physician fees and there is no mandated review or approval by government. Without such review and approval, the cost of the program to the taxpayer and to the aged will be significantly and unnecessarily inflated. Indeed, there lurk here the seeds of disaster to the whole program. The insurance carriers are almost certain to include the Blue Shield plans, which are physician-controlled and dominated. In the seventy plans throughout the country, nearly two-thirds of the board members are physicians, 15 per cent represent hospitals and about 21 per cent are from the public. A recent study by the University of Michigan had this to say about Michigan Blue Shield:

> *The strongest single influence upon Michigan Medical Service* [Blue Shield] *is the Michigan State Medical Society, which exercises direct or indirect control over every aspect of the plan's operation. Physicians and their professional organization certainly have a legitimate interest in the operation of Blue Shield. This interest has been so intense, however, that few basic policy decisions are made without either the prior approval of, or a subsequent review by one or more segments of the medical society.*

A Columbia University study, "Prepayment for Medical and Dental Care in New York State," notes the following:

> *Although labor and other public representatives are found on the Boards of all these plans* [Blue Shield], *the medical representatives far outweigh the non-physician directors in voting power in almost all plans.*

It is unprecedented and revolu-



tionary and clearly not in the public interest to allow the providers of service in a government-financed program to set their own fees without government review and approval.

A model of a more appropriate and responsible arrangement is that of the program for Servicemen's Dependents of the Department of Defense, which operates as follows:

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(1) The Secretary of Defense negotiates and approves a fee schedule with state medical societies or Blue Shield plans. In five areas of the country, the physicians use the fee schedule of Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company.

(2) The physicians agree that the payment by the government is payment in full.

This program has been in operation seven years. It is interesting in several respects. The state medical societies or the Blue Shield plans or, in a few instances, Mutual of Omaha, act as fiscal agents of the government. The fee schedules vary from state to state, depending largely upon fee schedules for similar income groups. The schedules are under periodic review for equity to the government and the physicians. The program has not committed the government to open-ended payments without fixed upper limits.

The experience of Blue Cross plans has been that groups of subscribers who later add physician coverage through Blue Shield increase their use of hospital services. The cause for this is not fully understood, but there is some reason to believe that insurance which pays a doctor a separate fee for each service he renders increases the aggregate number of services. Part B compounds this inflationary tendency by using general tax revenue to pay fee schedules established by private carriers.

Perhaps the most objectionable feature of the entire bill is a clause in Part B which would permit the doctor, under certain conditions, to charge a patient any fee he liked, in addition to the fee schedule established by the insurance company. For although, as under Blue Shield, some doctors will accept the listed fees as payment in full, others will not and there is nothing in the law which obliges them to do so. If this situation is allowed to remain, it will surely defeat the intent of the proposed act, for the patient will be forced to pay not only the 20 per cent coinsurance and the $50 deductible, but any additional amounts which the physician may wish to charge. Experience with Blue Shield plans throughout the country has repeatedly exposed the inadequacy of this kind of prepayment program, where the patient, under the impression that his bill will be paid in full, is shocked to find that his physician can and does charge a fee significantly higher than the Blue Shield reimbursement.

It has also been found that third-party payments for medical care, when there is no understanding that the sum paid by the third party is payment in full, simply increases the total cost of the service and leaves the patient with a large sum to pay.

Martin E. Segal, a leading consultant to industry and labor on pensions and health and welfare benefits, has given the following analysis of how the mathematics works in practice:

Our company analyzed over 10,000 surgical claims where benefits were paid under a $150 surgical schedule. We found that this surgical schedule paid only 55 per cent of the surgeon's total charges. A similar analysis, for claims paid under a $225 surgical schedule, showed that such a schedule paid 60 per cent of the surgeon's total charges. And an analysis of claims paid under a $300 surgical schedule showed that such a schedule paid only 69 per cent of the surgeon's total charges. As you can see, a 100 per cent increase in the surgical indemnity schedule served to reduce the patient's share of the bills by only 14 per cent.

All the patients covered by medicare will be older than 65; many of them will be infirm, and only a portion will either understand all of the clauses of their insurance policy, or be able to negotiate with the doctors about their charges. It seems odd for the government to take the great trouble of establishing an elaborate and complicated machinery to pay the physicians' bills of the elderly, and then allow the doctors to charge what they please — and place the burden of negotiation on the patient. Unless the bill is modified to assure paid-in-full benefits, this plan will merely guarantee the physician a specified sum of money for a service, while leaving him free to charge as much more as he thinks he can collect. The patient is deprived of the assurance that his supplementary policy will give him adequate financial protection when he is ill.

Still another section of the bill sets up a vast extension of the Medical Assistance to the Aged program — the Kerr-Mills Act which was passed several years ago as a means-test substitute for social security hospital benefits. There is no doubt that some provision must be made for the care of the medically indigent. The Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Health Insurance sections of the bill offer somewhat restricted benefits for persons over age 65. When these benefits are exhausted by a prolonged illness, many older persons will need to fall back upon public assistance (and additional funds should also be made available for the medically indigent who are younger than 65). The concept of medical indigency is relatively new, at least so far as legislative recognition is concerned. A medically



indigent person may be fully employed, he may own property, and he may be fully self-supporting except for medical and hospital expenses. Bills of several thousand dollars a year are not uncommon for prolonged illness.

If we must accept the fact that in the richest society the world has ever known, medical care for many of our citizens is to be obtained by a means test, the question that then arises is, who should administer the means test and who should plan and administer the medical-care program? The bill now states that these are the concerns of the state welfare departments. In effect, this means that county welfare departments will determine eligibility, case by case; select and pay physicians and hospitals and enforce whatever rules and regulations may be established as to the cost and quality of medical care for the medically indigent.

Eveline M. Burns, professor of

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social work, Columbia University, recently had this to say about welfare department administration of a program for the medically indigent:

It will put difficulties in the way of developing a test of financial eligibility for a health program that is both more liberal in its standards and less demeaning in its application and methods of investigation than the standards and methods characteristic of public assistance programs.

It places the welfare departments in difficulty when they have to apply two kinds of income or needs tests, very often to people who will be shifting back and forth from one category to another. It is also doubtful whether, with the best will in the world, public assistance administrators and investigators can so far divorce themselves from their traditional attitudes and policies as to administer a financial test in a truly non-deterrent manner.

All available evidence suggests that many technically eligible aged persons in need of medical care are not getting it because they are unwilling to come under the aegis of the welfare department (identified by them with public assistance and its offensive eligibility procedures). In other words, the location of administrative responsibility can adversely affect the use made of the service.

Welfare departments are not staffed or motivated to administer a health program. The New York State Department of Social Welfare, which in a recent twelve-month period spent $814 million for the various needs of relief clients, including medical care, and which in addition supervises and inspects the nursing homes and hospitals in the state, has one full-time physician on its staff. Medical-care programs should be administered by health agencies. State health departments are the logical agency for health-care administration at the state level, and the Public Health Service at the federal level has the experience and staff to establish and maintain standards.

What should we reasonably expect from a federal measure to finance some of the hospital and medical care of the elderly and the medically indigent of all ages? First, the methods of payment to hospitals and physicians should not inflate the cost of care, nor should they offer incentives to provide unnecessary care. Second, and as important, the federal government must not give away the public money to private groups without controlling the way the money is spent.

In a positive sense, HR 6675 needs to be strengthened so that the federal administration of the various programs will take full advantage of contemporary medicine's tremendous strides. Timorous legislation and administration will encourage mediocre and extravagant hospital and medical care. A recent policy statement from the New York Academy of Medicine said: "Whenever Federal, state, or local tax funds are allocated for health-care purposes, an appropriate governmental agency must be fully accountable for achievement of the purposes for which the funds were made available—including the establishment and maintenance of standards of performance and the administrative procedures required for economical use of funds."

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Fallacy of the Dominoes . . . . . C. P. FitzGerald

Canberra, Australia

A popular and officially approved description of the present dangers and strife in Southeast Asia goes by the name of the "domino" theory. It is claimed that, like dominoes, the countries of this region are mutually dependent for their security and survival: if one falls the others will be shaken and successively topple. Thus, if Vietnam as a whole passed under Communist rule, the same fate would soon befall Cambodia and Laos; then Thailand, Malaysia, Burma and Indonesia: even the Philippines would not long escape the general collapse. The Communists, encouraged by success in one country, would press on to others and these would not be able to resist the momentum of revolution and the strong subversive activities to which they would be subjected. Only the massive power of the United States really prevents this from happening, and consequently, however reluctantly, this power must be deployed at the point most in danger.

This analysis implies a corresponding view that is rarely stated. If one falls, all fall; therefore, if one stands, all will stand. Yet if this corollary is applied to the actual scene, one sees at once that it is not necessarily true, and does not correspond with the observed facts. Vietnam is being most vigorously defended against both the Vietcong rebellion within and the infiltration of North Vietnamese aid from without. At this very time, the rapid and seemingly irreversible slide of Indonesia toward a Communist or Communist-dominated regime continues unabated; it is in no way checked—indeed, it may be actually promoted—by events in Vietnam. One very big domino is wobbling, and shows every probability of falling, while the little one is still upheld. This irony is, perhaps, more readily apparent to the Australian public, close at hand, than to people in the distant United States.

Malaysia is also shaken, but not by what is going on in Vietnam. The policy of "confrontation," backed by the Indonesian Communist party and approved by Peking, is producing the growing and dangerous tensions in the recently constructed federation of Malaysia, and there seems no reason to suppose that victory for the government in Saigon would modify the policy to which both President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist party are dedicated. It is too often forgotten that one lasting legacy of colonial rule is the aloofness of the

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former colonial countries from one another, and their much closer relationship, whether of love or hate, to the former suzerain power. Vietnam still turns in matters cultural to France; Malaysia to Britain; and Indonesia, having finally expelled the Dutch from West New Guinea, now enjoys better relations with Holland than with any other Western power. But the shared concerns of these one-time colonies are as slight in practice today as they were in colonial times, when communication was almost entirely with the rulers in Europe. The neighboring languages are not taught in the various states, but the language of the former European overlord remains an important medium, known to all the educated class. Thus, to the average citizen of these countries the affairs of other states of the region matter very little.

The corollary to the domino theory is therefore dubious. It is quite possible that if or when the Vietnam war is settled by some compromise involving the continued existence of a non-Communist regime in the south, the West may find itself confronted with an Indonesia that has passed under Communist control and a Malaysia that is disintegrating. This situation would, for Australia at least, be far more menacing than a wholly Communist Vietnam. Burma, although eschewing the name of communism, is moving steadily toward a social system almost indistinguishable from that of the Communist-ruled countries of Southeast Asia. Private property is increasingly taken over by the state; liberty of travel abroad is almost suppressed, contact with Western visitors restricted, political opposition wholly outlawed.

The Mao Tse-tung rule of guerrilla warfare — to "surround the cities by the countryside"—is being applied on a huge scale. If South Vietnam is the beleaguered city still held by the anti-Communist forces, then Indonesia, Burma and soon, perhaps, Malaysia, are the "countryside" by which this city will be surrounded. [A review by Mr. FitzGerald of *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*: Jerome Ch'en, appears on page 703.]

There are other unconsidered factors in the relations between the states of Southeast Asia which throw some doubt on the theory that if one falls, all will successively fall. Though it is true that in the colonial era communication among these Asian neighbors was slight and tended to diminish, in pre-colonial times, there had been relations, usually hostile. Once Western rule was removed, these immediately reappeared, and with very little loss of emotional impact. The countries of the region at once resumed the feuds and promoted the ambitions which their royal rulers had pursued before the European peace was imposed upon them.

Burma and Thailand had been long-standing rivals: as late as the third quarter of the 18th century Burmese invaders sacked and burned the Thai capital of Ayudhia. Bangkok itself was founded as a fortress refuge against that invasion, and the memory of those events is keenly alive in Thailand today. Varying policies in the two countries and opposing alignment of their foreign policies reflect an old hostility. What Thailand does will not be copied by Burma, and the path that Burma chooses will be shunned by the Thais.

Cambodia was saved by French protection from double encroachment by the Annamite king (Vietnam) and Thailand, which were on the point of extinguishing this most ancient kingdom of Southeast Asia. Consequently, the Cambodians still feel a friendship for France and still fear and dislike their neighbors. During the late war the Thais once more, with Japanese encouragement, encroached upon Cambodia, annexing the Angkor region itself. These conquests were nullified at the end of the war, but an acrimonious frontier dispute has continued to the present time. The association of Thailand and South Vietnam together in the Western alliance is enough to place Cambodia in the other camp, and Prince Sihanouk's policy is manifestly far more governed by such considerations than by fear of China or trust in the United States.

But if all Vietnam, reunited and potentially again strong, came under Communist control, Cambodia would almost certainly seek other alliances, and would strongly oppose any policy that encouraged Vietnamese domination — whether Communist or not. Nor would Cambodia feel much confidence in the good will or peaceful intentions of a Communist Thailand. China might be relied upon, or entreated, to preserve the independence of Cambodia; and China, in the pre-European age in Southeast Asia,

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always sought to keep the smaller kingdoms in balance, preventing the too great power of any one placing its weight and influence on the side of whichever was at the moment the weaker.

Malaya (now part of Malaysia) adjoins Thailand in the north, and the southern province of Thailand is Malay in race. Until as late as 1910, the most northerly states of Malaya were under Thai rule which was surrendered to the British in that year. During the war, again with Japanese permission, Thailand occupied and annexed the northern sultanates; some Malays were willing to administer them under Thai supervision. There thus remains a considerable distrust and veiled enmity between the Malay ruling class in Malaysia and the authorities in Bangkok. One reason for the refusal of Malaysia to join SEATO can be found in this situation.

The present enmity between Indonesia and Malaysia also has roots much deeper than the ambitions and emotions of President Sukarno. Throughout the greater part of precolonial history the two sides of the narrow Malacca Strait, Sumatra and Malaya, were under one rule; and this kingdom was very rarely linked politically with the rulers of Java. The historic connection of Sumatra, both by race and commerce and formerly by a political unity, also is with Malaya, not with Java. The Japanese, toward the end of the war, planned and prepared to re-create a new state, "Mahamalaya," to embrace Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Several prominent—and still prominent—Malay and Sumatran politicians cooperated with Count Terauchi in this plan, which only the end of the war aborted. A disintegration of Malaysia could revive these former connections, and similarly the breakup of Indonesia could lead to a new union between Sumatra and Malaya. But these changes would not stem from any domino theory; they would be a renewal of old historic relationships in a modern setting.

Other minor tensions between neighbors loom large in their eyes. The Philippines claim Sabah —the former British North Borneo —on the somewhat tenuous basis that early pirate sultans ruled at least the coast of this relatively remote region. Nor do the Filipinos forget that their southern islands are inhabited by Moslems, descendants of former Malay colonists, whose cultural links are with Moslem Indonesia rather than with the Catholic Philippines.

All these ancient claims and quarrels are more important, more real and more urgent to the peoples of Southeast Asia than the conflict of communism backed by China and anti-communism backed by the United States. That contest is seen essentially as the quarrel of two great outsiders, to be used for promoting national ambitions or thwarting those of traditional foes, but in itself extraneous to the countries themselves. The Asians may well be wrong to take such an attitude, but the West is also much deluded when it thinks of these states as being without personalities of their own, willing to enlist on one side or the other in a global conflict, obedient to the behests of Washington or Peking. "The enemy of my enemy is my friend," is an axiom firmly held in Southeast Asia, and the outcome of policy directed by this idea produces a highly complex pattern of loves and hates.

The domino theory also rests upon an assumption which is hardly flattering to the champions of democracy. It postulates that communism is attractive to the peoples of these states and that the menaced countries have no internal strength to resist it. It is well known that in truth communism has not been spread in these lands by an alien Red army, as was the case in Eastern Europe after the war. The North Vietnamese may be wholly, or only partly, responsible for the Vietcong rebellion, but it is certain that they are Vietnamese, not Chinese. The Pathet Laos are Laotians —attempts to prove even a North Vietnamese military presence have never been at all convincing. The Burmese Communist rebels were Burmese, and were not helped by Chinese forces across the border. The Indonesian Communist party, one of the largest in the world, is wholly Indonesian in leadership and overwhelmingly so in membership.

It has therefore to be accepted that communism spreads in these countries without the military presence of alien Red armies; but it is also argued that it cannot be stopped without the presence and active operations of Western military forces. This line of reasoning comes very close to admitting that communism gains the support of the people, but anti-communism needs the support of outside force. Yet it is not necessary to draw quite so dismal a conclusion.

The real evidence suggests that it is not communism or anti-communism which makes great appeal to mass opinion in these countries, but nationalism. Nationalism has meant, and to most still means, first of all anti-European policies. The former colonial rulers must give up every pretension to influence and power. They may still be linked by culture and education with their former subjects, but they must be politically extirpated in the erstwhile colonies. Consequently, the presence of Western forces immediately justifies the activity of all who oppose them, under whatever banner. This has been the great strength of the Communist parties in these countries. Where the West has wholly withdrawn, the Communist party soon loses ground. The Malayan "Emergency," the local name for the Communist insurrection, was brought to an end by the grant of full independence to Malaysia. In Burma the refusal of the government to align with the West weakened the appeal of the Communist rebels, while the left-wing Socialist policy of the government undermined their social program. Confrontation with Malaysia is a necessity to the Indonesian Communist party, because the defense by British troops of North Borneo and the peninsula makes it possible to enlist nationalist anti-Western feeling. President Sukarno relies on the same sentiments for his support. Communist movements which are actually engaged in warfare with Western armies will continue to gain the covert support of much public opinion even when governments find it politic to approve the policies of the West. The application of the domino theory is thus self-defeating; it generates the very forces which it hopes to contain.

It remains to ask how far the major Communist powers, and China in particular, subscribe to their version of the domino theory, and whether they, too, are mistaken if they trust to it. Communist theory teaches that no revolution can come about, or should be promoted, until the country concerned is ripe

(Continued on page 712)

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Mao: Patriot and Communist

MAO AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. With Thirty-Seven Poems by Mao Tse-tung. By Jerome Ch'en. Translated from the Chinese by Michael Bullock and Jerome Ch'en. Oxford University Press. 419 pp. $7.50.

C. P. FitzGerald

There have been a number of books published on the life and times of Mao Tse-tung. This one is without qualification the best. As the title implies, it deals with Mao and the Chinese Revolution only up to the end of that event (if end it was), the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. Mr. Ch'en, a scholarly historian, is not prepared to cover the period for which true history cannot yet be written, and since his subject is still alive, and in power, it would also be inappropriate to write the "life of Mao Tse-tung." One of the most important points in Mr. Ch'en's treatment of his subject is the clear and unequivocal place he finds for Mao, not as a strange monster born of some mysterious new race of men, "the Communists," but as the last of a long line of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, stretching back to the early 19th century. This tradition began with the officials of the empire who, convinced by brute force of the superiority of Western armaments, sought to purchase such weapons in order to make China strong enough to repel all further Western encroachments. These men were conservatives, but somewhat more in touch with reality than their colleagues who would have no truck with any Western novelty. When the mere acquisition of Western weapons, without the capacity to manufacture them, failed miserably, there arose a new school which followed the advice of the great viceroy and scholar, Chang Chih-tung who counseled "Ti Yung," "Basis and Use"—i.e., Chinese learning as the Basis, Western learning for Use. Science and technology might now be studied, but Chinese ways must prevail in politics, philosophy, customs and law. This, too, failed to provide the key to the "search for wealth and power" which increasingly preoccupied the Chinese intellectuals.

The revolutionary movements of the late 19th century went further still. The constitutional monarchists, such as K'ang Yu-wei and the Emperor Kuang Hsu, had their brief liberal experiment and were destroyed by reaction; the republicans of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, going further still, overthrew the dynasty and founded a republic which became almost at once the prey and sport of military adventurers. The search for wealth and power continued to elude the Chinese reformers. The Nationalists brought the idea of the Party Government (borrowed from Russia with adornments from Italy) but the problem remained of how to unite, strengthen and restore the Chinese state.

Mao Tse-tung, as he rose to power through the ranks of the new Communist Party, inherited this continuing aim of his predecessors. The Kuomintang became lost in a maze of party intrigue, military ambition and personal corruption; the Communist Party, narrowly avoiding the first danger and overcoming the other two, emerged as the victors in the long struggle and achieved the long-sought objective. Wealth in China, on the national scale, may still be relative and far behind the economic prosperity of many other nations; yet it has vastly increased in the past decade. Power has been attained. The poor, distracted, wrecked and half-starving country which the Communist government took over in 1949 was, in 1964, able to explode its first nuclear device, and now six months later has, it seems, built a nuclear bomb. China has paid her dues: however unwelcome to the older members, she can no longer be excluded from the club.

This is, to a very large extent, the achievement of Mao Tse-tung: he himself and other orthodox Communists would attribute their success to the "correct leadership of the Communist Party" and the support and cooperation of a liberated people; but the record, which Mr. Ch'en so carefully and accurately documents, proves that this leadership was not in fact effective at all until it devolved upon Mao Tse-tung—who also made mistakes, but who knew how to learn from them and change a bad policy. The Chinese Communist Party in its early years was extremely doctrinaire, and dominated by Russian-trained leaders and Russian advisers. It was often forgotten by those who talked of the Chinese Communist leadership as creatures or puppets of the Soviet, that this dependence was completely reversed by the rise to power of that very native son, Mao Tse-tung, who neither spoke nor read any foreign language and had never been beyond the borders of China.

No one would now dispute his pre-eminence in the story of the Chinese Revolution, but many varying interpretations are made of his character. Mr. Ch'en takes an early opportunity, when dealing with Mao's boyhood, to dispose of one myth: that cruelly treated by a sadistic father Mao grew up a warped psychopath. He points out that if boyhood beatings had had this effect on Mao, the whole Chinese people, rich and poor alike (and he might have added the English too), would be a race of psychopaths, for such forms of discipline were universal in Chinese families of all classes at that period.

Mao, as a youth, was typical of the youth of all Asia, both in his own generation and subsequent ones. He began as an ardent admirer of his nation's glorious past and its heroes: the contrast between that glory and present weakness aroused and shocked him; he began to search for the cause of the decline, and for the remedy which could restore China. Thousands of others in all parts of Asia have had the same experience, but only a few persisted logically with the inquiry until they, at least, were satisfied that they had found the answer. Mr. Ch'en sums up Mao Tse-tung as "this learned, resolute, experienced, ruthless and sensitive man." These are not, or not all, the adjectives which many Western observers would have expected. Mao's intellectual grasp has been underestimated, his resolution, experience and ruthlessness perhaps overstressed, his sensitivity wholly ignored.

"War is the essence of violence: moderation in warfare is weakness." These words from a very non-Communist statesman, the late Lord Fisher, one time First Lord of the British Admiralty, would certainly be approved by the Communist leader who has

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said: "Power grows from the barrel of a gun," and that a revolution "cannot be . . . restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another." He has also said, in the hour of final triumph, that China could now "take the road of independence, freedom, peace, unity, strength and prosperity." Western observers will be inclined to pick out "independence," "strength" and "prosperity" from these aims as those which are most real and urgent to Mao. But it would be wrong not to believe that "freedom," as he understands it (that is, freedom from exploitation), "peace" and "unity" are not just as important in his thinking. These were the goals for which, in their groping way, his conservative Ch'ing dynasty predecessors and the early reformers such as K'ang Yu-wei and Dr. Sun Yat-sen also strove; they are the intellectual heritage of four generations of modern Chinese thinkers; Mao Tse-tung was bred in that tradition; he has transformed it and achieved its first objectives.

Students of the confused history of the Chinese Revolution will long remain in the debt of Mr. Ch'en for his clear and careful guidance through the maze of feud and intrigue which marked the late twenties. The misjudgments of Stalin, the latent cause of present Sino-Soviet quarrels, are fully documented, as are the conflicting policies of the early Chinese Communist leadership. Mr. Ch'en sees these conflicts as fundamental to the development of the Chinese Communist movement. Li Li-san followed the pattern of revolution which was "the classical Franco-Russian pattern and its underlying theory was the orthodox Marxism; the pattern Mao followed, on the other hand, was the classical Chinese peasant war, and its theoretical basis was Marxism adapted to suit the Chinese background." This appraisal contains not only the basic truth of the Chinese Revolution but also the real cause of the Sino-Soviet split.

As early as 1930, the divergence between these two policies had, after the disastrous failure to take the city of Ch'angsha, opened a crack in the ideology of the world Communist movement. It was at first only apparent in the political struggle for leadership within the Chinese Communist Party, a struggle which Mao Tse-tung won conclusively at the Tsunyi Conference held during the Long March in 1935. Later, this divergence gradually made itself clear in the immediate postwar period, when once again Stalin was unable to appreciate the power of the Chinese peasant-based movement, and still counseled delay and compromise. Finally, the development of policy under the People's Republic and the problem posed by peasant-style revolutions in countries beyond China have magnified this old quarrel into a crisis of world proportions. But these developments lie beyond the scope of Mr. Ch'en's book.

Mr. Ch'en's adjective "sensitive" in his assessment of the character of Mao Tse-tung is best illustrated by the second part of his book, the translations, in collaboration with Michael Bullock, of thirty-seven of Mao Tse-tung's poems, written during the past forty years, the earliest in 1926, the last in 1963. Mao writes poetry in the classical style, the old great tradition of Chinese literature, and as the author says, "lacks knowledge of modern poetry."

"The Immortal," a poem written in memory of his wife, Yang K'ai-hui, who was killed by the Kuomintang in 1930, sufficiently establishes the fact that Mao is a man of deep human feelings. It must also be remembered that two of his brothers also lost their lives either in battle or at the hands of Kuomintang executioners. It is significant that Mao wrote more than one of these poems for his old friend, Liu Ya-tzu (who died in 1950), a scholar who was never a member of the Communist Party.

According to the judgment of his countrymen these are "very elegant poems," which the authors have endeavored to render into English, while retaining "the vigorous, almost violent, and distinctly staccato quality" of the original Chinese style. Readers can judge for themselves how far this attempt has been successful, but it can be said with certainty that had Mao Tse-tung never been known as a major political leader, his poetry would have given him a place in the history of Chinese literature.

On Translating Mao's Poetry

Donald Davie

The muse of poetry disapproves of mixed marriages, or so it seems, except when the mixture is a translation of Chinese to English. There are, of course, verse translations from Chinese that read as inertly and foolishly as most verse translations do. But the translations of Michael Bullock and Jerome Ch'en are not among them; their versions of thirty-seven poems by Mao (*Mao and the Chinese Revolution*) can be read with steady pleasure.

All the same, the poetry still seems to be a marriage of the two languages, not a marriage of true minds —of the Chinese poet on the one hand, the English-speaking translator on the other. If the translators had been foolish and prosy there would have been no marriage at all. But one begins to suspect that there is a sort of illusion (a very happy one, of course) which explains why Chinese poetry so often reads well in English dress. The quality of Chinese poetry is exactly that quality which our poetry, in the present century, has adapted itself specifically to secure. In particular, one of the 20th-century English poetic styles, imagist *vers libre*, might have been (and in fact it partly was) devised deliberately to give the translator from the Chinese just what he wants and needs to perform intelligently.

How this works can be seen when the translators remark of Mao's "Yellow Crane Tower" that "Of the two stanzas of this poem, the first is unquestionably the better." Of the poem as we have it in English, this just isn't true:

Broad, broad
through the country
flow the nine tributaries.
Deep, deep
from north to south
cuts a line.
Blurred in the blue haze
of the rain and mist
The Snake and Tortoise Hills
tower above the water.

The yellow crane
has departed.
Who knows where it has gone?
Only this resting-place
for travellers remains.
In wine I drink
a pledge to the surging torrent.
The tide of my heart
rises as high as the waves.

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It would be, I suppose, sheer whimsy to object that the translators should have purposely written less distinguished English verse for the second stanza than the first. Still the relative failure of the second may have had to do with Mao's imagination responding more vigorously to some themes and attitudes than to others. And this would tell us something worth knowing about Mao the man. In fact Mr. Bullock and Mr. Ch'en present their translations in just these terms—as throwing invaluable light on Mao's personality. But the poems do not do this; and for them to have done it, the translators would have had to vow themselves to a faithfulness so total as to be impossibly utopian.

It is a sad fact that no translation, however accomplished, can provide us with an insight into the man. When Mao is made to say in one poem that "the landscape is strangely charming," and in another that "On the battlefield/ yellow flowers are singularly fragrant," a reader would be unusually naive about the processes of translation to deduce simply from this that in Mao there hides a fastidiously self-regarding and judicious aesthete. This is an intriguing possibility. But it remains only a possibility. The truth is that the most sophisticated of us has in his head a drastically oversimplified model of what the act of translation is and entails.

For instance, when Mr. Bullock and Mr. Ch'en tell us that three of these pieces "have a thread of melancholy running through them and are very elegant poems," should we read "are" to mean "are regarded as"? Or are the translators unaware that, rightly or wrongly, "melancholy" and "elegant" are both questionable terms in the modern Anglo-American poetic, and never more suspect than when they are linked together?

All this is not to deny that in these, as in other translated poems, there are things which are the poet's rather than the translator's. And for myself I am unreasonably reassured to know that the dictator of Red China is capable of the sentiment:

Had heaven feelings it would long since have grown old!

And yet even here, though the substance is doubtless Mao's, the inflection may well be the translator's. And how much of poetry resides in the inflection, the tone of voice! For instance:

Such is the beauty of these mountains and rivers
That has been admired by unnumbered heroes —
The great emperors of Ch'in and Han
Lacking literary brilliance,
Those of T'ang and Sung
Having but few romantic inclinations,
And the prodigious Gengis Khan
Knowing only how to bend his bow and shoot at vultures.
All are past and gone!
For men of vision
We must seek among the present generation.

"Having but few romantic inclinations" is the very voice of Ezra Pound, in that work, *Cathay*, which as Eliot said, invented Chinese poetry for the 20th century — in English, that is. The translators cite the last two lines to show how "melancholy" and "elegant" are not always the epithets for Mao's poetry. Fair enough. And yet they could sound melancholy enough, if read in a certain way. Is it Mao who speaks these lines, which in isolation might be heroically affirmative, in a tone still shadowed by the urbanity, and undercut by the melancholy, of the line about "romantic inclinations"? Is this Mao's inflection? Or Pound's, transmitted through Mr. Bullock or Mr. Ch'en? I suspect, on the evidence of some of the less attractive of these pieces, that the Chinese is unambiguously heroic, in a way which the translators cannot reproduce because reputable contemporary Anglo-American poetry has no heroic idiom into which it can be transposed.

Thus poetry, for good or ill, continues to be useless as a window into the political man. It was a good idea of Mr. Ch'en's to include these translations because reading a man's poems, at whatever translated remove, is always better than just being told he has written them. They tell us something valuable about the poetic vocation — that it can be a respectable avocation for the man of action and affairs, as it has often been in the past and as it is in the present for many emergent nations, though not for the English speakers. But the poems tell us nothing, really, about the poet; if they had been worse poems they would have told us more.

A Continent of Villages

VILLAGE IN VIETNAM. By Gerald C. Hickey. Yale University Press. 325 pp. $10.

A CHINESE VILLAGE: Taitou, Shantung Province. By Martin C. Yang. Columbia University Press. 275 pp. $2.25 paper.

REPORT FROM A CHINESE VILLAGE. By Jan Myrdal. Pantheon Books. 374 pp. $6.95.

Robert G. Wesson

Asians, 80 to 90 per cent of them in most countries, are peasants; and so are their revolutionaries. Hence books which shed light on peasant life and thinking are most welcome, and these are no disappointment.

Despite our involvement in Vietnam, there has been little written in English on the Vietnamese themselves; the very few books we have are rather thin. Mr. Hickey, however, has made a serious ethnological study of a fairly typical village in the neighborhood of Saigon, studied in 1958-59 and subsequently revisited. He introduces us to the manner of constructing homes, to farming practices (everyone in the village depends upon agriculture), to religious and spiritist customs, to the elaborate kinship patterns (largely established during the period of Chinese rule, 221 B.C. to 939 A.D.), to marital folkways and the way Vietnamese children are trained. He analyzes the economy and social classes; the peasants are by no means down and out but have fairly adequate amounts of land to which they apply commercial fertilizer. Those who own less than 5 acres or rent less than 6 generally live in houses with thatched roofs and are considered the lower classes; they make up three-quarters of the village's population, which is 3,200. Those of higher status are likely to possess a bicycle or even perhaps a motorbike. Six households have radios.

Mr. Hickey also describes the political administration of his village. However, he does not seek to shed much light on the strength of the Vietcong in the countryside. From

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his account, one concludes that the villagers are fairly indifferent to political causes and desire only to be left alone, a conclusion which hardly seems consistent with the violence of political struggle in that unhappy country. In 1945, upon the departure of the Japanese, the Vietminh (as the peasants call what the government calls the Vietcong) took over the village but withdrew when the French returned and reinstated the traditional village council (appointed from above except for an unsuccessful experiment with elections).

In subsequent years, there was much irregular conflict in which the wealthy were generally pro-French and the poor inclined to favor the guerrillas who controlled the land by night. In 1955, after the Geneva settlement, the party of Ngo Dinh Diem was established as the sole political organization, but in 1958, guerrilla activities were resumed and soon government control by night again shrank to the area protected by barbed wire and stockade. The Vietcong were only slightly checked by the Strategic Hamlet Program; their parties were soon entering the supposedly protected village freely, oddly enough without any conflict with village defense units. The government set up various anti-Communist organizations and carried on extensive propaganda; all villagers were required to attend periodic Communist denunciation meetings. Why these efforts were ineffective is not clear, but it may be related to the fact that two-thirds of the land was rented. After the coup of November, 1963, governmental authority in the countryside further disintegrated, and the previously desultory conflict became much more intense.

Mr. Yang's book, originally published in 1945 and now reissued as a paperback, describes a not entirely dissimilar world, his native village in northeast China in the first quarter of this century. With the somewhat jagged style of one who has learned to write perfectly in English but not to think in English, Mr. Yang offers a mass of interesting details of this bygone society which, after the fall of the Manchu dynasty, continued to live essentially as it had for ages past, guided by almost timeless customs and Confucianist ethics. Family relations were more formal and intricate than in Vietnam; elders and ancestors were duly venerated, and life revolved around the social and economic unit of the family, to which the greater part of the book is devoted. Fame still derived largely from having a member of the family who had passed the imperial examinations, even if it had happened generations ago. In school, children memorized the classics and practiced calligraphy. Husbands and wives pretended indifference, and witchcraft was still occasionally used. The status of families was measured by the quality of their ox, and diet was more adequate than it has usually been in subsequent decades. The gentry ruled and no one questioned their right. There was a certain freedom: the government left the village alone as long as taxes were paid, and the villagers elected their own leaders to deal with the administration. Despite opportunities for squeeze, men of upper class did not want to be headman as they felt it would cause them to lose face. Altogether, it is a rather idyllic picture which should delight old China hands.

But beneath the surface there were seeds of revolutionary change. The introduction of Christianity, protected by foreign powers, had brought new and sharp divisions. A semi-modern school was established to give a very different education. Factory-made shoes and cloth were making peasant crafts obsolete. There was an incipient realization that farming was handicapped by the old style of landholding, under which any one family might hold many small and separated strips. For a time, there was much banditry, against which the village protected itself with a local militia, gun emplacements and even a crude mine belt. The government was beginning seriously to impinge upon the life of the village, with roads, schools, military training and a public health program. Such disturbing factors, however, seemed in the 1920s mere incidentals in the calm and orderly existence of a people content with the assurance that their ancestors were still with them.

A very different view is presented by Jan Myrdal, who relates the stories of Chinese peasants as they were told to him in a month of intensive interviewing in 1962. The village he studied lies in northwest China, near Yenan, where the Long March came to rest and where Mao made his headquarters from 1936 to 1945. Old and young speak their turn; and they have much to say of their epochal times. Least interesting was a Communist functionary who stated that the village had no problems (and was thereupon cut off by the author). Perhaps most interesting, at least for those with bourgeois weaknesses, is the account of the counterrevolutionary who came back from three years of corrective labor to join the collective farm but still has not given his heart to it. Curiously, although his earnings are only those of an ordinary laborer, his home (which, like almost everyone's, is a cave excavated in a hillside) was the only one graced with flowers and the cleanest in the village; his children were neatest, best dressed and healthiest; and he had two of the four village children in the Yenan middle school.

The old regime, the order which Yang depicted as bucolic if not delightful, is treated as a time of profound unhappiness and unrest. One misses the millennial stability traditionally associated with rural China; the peasants would seem to have been perpetually on the move and uprisings were brewing even before the Communists arrived, although Shensi province was blessed with an abundance of land for relatively few people. Despite material inferiority, the Communists won the guerrilla war, it appears, because they knew all about the movements of the Nationalists, who had great difficulty in procuring information. They could travel everywhere in the countryside in small groups, whereas the Nationalists had to go in large detachments, and their indoctrination of prisoners was successful. Perhaps most important, they promised an end of rent and taxes.

The new village born of the revolution inevitably contains some of the old. Men still celebrate their sixtieth birthdays as the fulfillment of their life span, and it is enormously important that a family have a son to carry on the lineage. Even Communists make offerings on the graves. Often the old resists the new: the teacher tries to get boys and girls to play together, but they segregate according to traditional propriety when he turns his back. And the old takes a new shape: in the marriage ceremony, the couple bows not to heaven and earth but to a portrait of Chairman Mao. But marriage is pretty much by free choice, and only reactionaries reject family planning. Many of the ceremonial aspects of life have been diminished, and there is as much emphasis on change as there was on tradition in the old China. Perhaps the greatest development is that the peasants, formerly left to themselves, have been enmeshed in a vast and

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complicated organization — the all-encompassing People's Militia, the East Shines Red Higher Agricultural Cooperative and now the people's commune, with work points, committees, labor groups and conferences, awards for merit workers and political education, all steered by the guiding hand of the party.

Still, the peasants seem a bit detached. One senses a gap between them and the ganbus, or men of the official apparatus, though it is by no means as great as that which existed between officials and common folk in the old days. In 1958, a commune was established on the advice of Chairman Mao and the collective farm became a labor brigade, but this seems to have changed little in actual practice and only the party leader has much to say about the commune. As for the world outside, neither Russia nor the United States receives more than incidental mention. But perhaps the circle of awareness will expand with modernization, and this gradually goes forward. Many caves have loud-speakers; and thermos bottles, factory blankets and bicycles are common. The brigade has acquired rubber-tired carts, and "In ten years' time we shall have manure trucks."

Mr. Myrdal has put together an illuminating book. He tried to work his interpreters (one of whom did educational manual labor in the village "to transform myself from a bourgeoisie to a human being") so intensively that not much could be distorted. With the sympathy of his own Swedish peasant background he has caught a great deal of a monumental transformation.

Symbol of a Moment

NEHRU: The First Sixty Years. Edited by Dorothy Norman. Foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru. The John Day Co. Vol. I, 698 pp. Vol. II, 614 pp. $27.50 the set.

James Tracy Crown

Louis Mountbatten in London and Allen Ginsberg in Calcutta alerted me to the significance of Dorothy Norman's decade of collecting and ordering the public statements of Jawaharlal Nehru. She was, I was informed, in the "catbird seat" within the Nehru residence mining literally "tons" of information. The fascinating two-volume collection of many of Nehru's unpublished writings, speeches and interviews is by no means an "insider's" book, however, but an illuminating, straightforward profile of that limited, but important, area of Indian public life which was Nehru.

"I am a symbol of the present moment," Nehru somewhat grandiosely told a British court sentencing him in 1941, and it is as a symbol of the thought and issues of his time that serious readers of social history will take up these volumes. But the general reader — often shrewder about the relevance of things — will look first for the character of the man behind the public record. And although, as Dorothy Norman warns us in her brief introduction, she has disregarded his views of history, his interesting literary commentaries and most references to his life, enough letters and personal passages are included to give insights into his private development.

In 1922, the young Nehru told a British judge that he had returned from Harrow and Cambridge and was in his likes and dislikes "perhaps more an Englishman than an Indian. I looked upon the world almost from an Englishman's standpoint." Gandhi used almost identical words in 1939 to describe the rising leader of the Congress Party. Gandhi saw that Nehru's English identity, combined with his unflinching patriotism, served to broaden his outlook and through him the nationalist movement. But he added, in a line approaching reproof, Nehru "is often more at home with Englishmen than with his own countrymen." This twofold commitment helps explain the legendary verbal conflicts between Nehru and Gandhi, and Nehru's quarrels with the power bloc in his party.

Quarrel as they might, however, Congress' dependence on the resourceful Nehru was obvious to Gandhi, even during his own active years. Nehru saw to that. In a court scene worthy of the most implausible historical novel, Nehru told a British trial judge: "You are a symbol of the state, but I am something more than an individual also. . . . I am a symbol of Indian nationalism." He then turned the tables on the judge and prosecutor with the declaration: "The British Empire itself is on trial before the bar of the world. There are more powerful forces at work in the world today than the courts of law."

Nehru's ability to make a symbol of both himself and India led to his successes, but the results, in part, are responsible for many of the misconceptions Westerners still have of India. We must recall that while Nehru's life and some of his writings were works of art, his political career was of limited relevance to the average Indian. Of the laudable aims claimed for Nehru by Dorothy Norman — "dedication to independence from colonial rule, to democracy and equality of opportunity, to the obliteration of communalist hatred, and of poverty and hunger; to a concentrated effort to reduce international misunderstandings and tensions, to humanism and the dignity of man" — few finally can be judged as having been fulfilled; his only unqualified accomplishment was independence from direct colonial rule. Westerners in sympathy do not understand the gravity of food scarcities, population surge, communal clashes and organizational malfunctioning, in part because the symbols that men like Nehru and Gandhi made of both themselves and India still remain in the forefront of their imaginations.

Yet the fact that Nehru was larger than life made him a force which India could understand. There can be no doubt that he was adored by large segments of the masses, even though, beyond voting, he could never involve them actively in his economic and social plans. With Rooseveltian zest he traveled "by airplane, railway, automobile, motor truck, horse carriages of various kinds, bullock cart, bicycle, elephant, camel, horse, steamer, paddle-boat, canoe, and on foot." He was trapped by the love of his countrymen and throughout his lifetime he would spare nothing to go among them. Sometimes this almost seemed like an addiction. Even during the week the Chinese were pouring through the defenses of Assam, I encountered him presiding at a minor professional meeting of which he was, not surprisingly, honorary chairman; garlanding young ladies at a song fest; attending a garden tea party; talking about farm

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techniques to a crowd of cooperative farm leaders — in addition to major speeches and broadcasts. It was almost as though there were little else for him to do with his waning energies.

This addiction to popular appeal contrasts with his distaste for party matters. He complained of a tendency for Congress to become like "Tammany Hall." As he wrote a party rival, "I have kept absolutely aloof from [factions] these many years. I function individually without any group or second person to support me, although I am happy enough to possess the confidence of many." This aloofness helped him maintain the important role of arbiter in Indian politics, but it also explains why Nehru failed to develop a party or even a powerful wing of a party which was wholeheartedly committed to his program. In one dramatic exchange of letters Gandhi rebuked Nehru for offering to resign his place on the working committee of the party which was dominated by reactionary thought. "If they are guilty of intolerance, you have more than your share of it," the Mahatma wrote his high-spirited young disciple, advising Nehru to let his humor play upon the situation and warning that "the country should not be made to suffer for your mutual intolerance."

Then, as later, Nehru showed good manners and gave in, preserving the semblance of unity, but at a heavy price. He kept fresh a brave, progressive image of India abroad, while at home he complained: "We are a people not overfond of change, always trying to forget our present misery and degradation in vague fancies of our glorious past and immortal civilization."

The theme which emerges as central in these volumes was, in fact, central to Nehru's entire life — the attempt to relate thought and action, to transform ideas into actions. While he acknowledged that in long-range terms "the prophet's approach is the better one," he still felt that "if a politician attempted such a course he would cease to have an opportunity to carry on." And he was a politician, well aware of the path which "leads from compromise to compromise." As he explained to an American university audience, "We talk of peace and prepare for war. We discuss internationalism and one world, and yet narrow nationalisms govern our activities." To the same audience he stated, "I am no prophet, nor have I any magic remedy to suggest. I have tried to grope my way, to think straight and to coordinate, as far as possible, action to thought. I have often found it difficult to do so, for action on the political plane is not individual action but group and mass action."

Any statesman who indulges in intellectual speculation to the extent that Nehru did, is bound to attract readers who ask how clearly events were foreseen. Such readers will enjoy Nehru's analysis in the spring of 1939: "There are only two powers in the world today which count in the ultimate analysis — the United States of America and the Soviet Union. . . . All other powers are of second rank compared to these two and have to rely on alliances for their protection. And as time passes, the disparity will increase." In February, 1936, he predicted the ouster of Chiang Kai-shek; included in these pages is a telegram from Mao, two years later, thanking Nehru and Congress for the contribution of a medical unit to his forces. Nehru also anticipated the shape of the Commonwealth, Afro-Asian cooperation in anti-colonialism, the Indian National Planning Commission, and a true world government, remarking in the latter case, "There is no other remedy for the world's sickness."

Many of his predictions of international conduct were quite hard-headed, such as his warning "whether a country is imperialistic or Socialist or Communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interest of that country." Still some of his prophecies did not work out so well, as with his oft-expressed hope for an Asian federation with China and India at its center. Yet it is a credit to the author as well as the editor that both Nehru's correct and incorrect estimates are permitted to stand and the reader allowed to make his own judgments.

This "first sixty years" of Nehru's public statements includes material only up through the year 1950, when India became a republic. The two exceptions to this are Nehru's bright, cheerful will published at his death and a rather sad foreword to this two-volume work which the stricken Prime Minister wrote shortly before his death when the central question in his mind was still whether he had done right by Mahatma Gandhi. Nehru was, as he himself claimed, "a symbol of the present moment." That he is no longer, makes many of us realize how much of our own present is past.

The Useful Victorian

ASQUITH: Portrait of a Man and an Era. By Roy Jenkins. Chilmark Press. 572 pp. $7.95.

Christopher Sykes

To anyone born in Great Britain in the first decade of our century, Asquith is something of a father figure. He was continuously Prime Minister for eight years and was the last British statesman to preside over the Britain of the long post-Napoleonic peace. His was a quietly dominating figure. Political enemies of the day often spoke of him as a monster of radical revolutionism, but in appearance, mind and way of life he was a thorough Victorian. He was the reverse of Puritan but had, like the great Victorians, their deep Puritan belief in the inevitable beneficence of progress. He was never very popular and did not seek to be a public idol, but he enjoyed more of wide genuine respect than any of his successors until Winston Churchill in World War II. There is something of the fascination of paradox about him.

Mr. Roy Jenkins, at present Minister of Aviation in the British Labour Government, has produced a definitive biography which may be said to have displaced the official and very one-sided work of J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, published in 1932. There emerges a full, interesting and fair picture of this remarkable statesman.

During most of the story Mr. Jenkins firmly holds the attention of his reader, and, like all good biography, this often gives the delight that we get from a first-rate novel. Not always however. British parliamentary life in the pre-1914 years was of a quite exceptional complexity and Mr. Jenkins, a member of Parliament writing about Parliament, is not always able to re-

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Christopher Sykes, a producer with the B.B.C., is the author of Four Studies in Loyalty *(Sloane)*, The Answer to Question 33 *(Sloane)*, Two Studies in Virtue *(Knopf)*, Orde Wingate *(World)*.

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cord its tortuous career in a way that a non-parliamentarian can follow readily. The first part of his account of what he calls "the Irish Imbroglio" is taxing to an English reader, and to many American readers is likely to be almost incomprehensible. Too many technical terms remain untranslated, and too much previous knowledge is assumed.

When it appeared in England, Mr. Jenkins' book was criticized in some quarters as lacking candor. This seems mistaken. The case for Asquith is always stated and the case against him never pressed—in that sense the book is partisan — but the reader is left to make his own judgment, and there is no suppression of those awkward facts which serve to dim halos.

As a statesman Asquith's most dangerous fault seems to have been insularity, both in a national and personal sense. In the international sphere he can remind one of Stanley Baldwin. Foreign affairs seem to have bored him and it is extraordinary how rarely and how uninterestingly they are mentioned in this detailed life of a prime minister who was called on to lead his country into a world war.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in the Liberal government of 1906 to 1915 is that the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, shared this disdain and distaste for life outside the British Isles. Asquith often traveled on the continent of Europe but rarely seems to have sought political opportunity in so doing, and it never entered his head to visit America. He went to meet Woodrow Wilson in Europe in a spirit of pure and unpolitical curiosity.

In the personal sphere this insularity had a curiously narrowing effect on his life. His symphathies did not readily flow beyond the cultivated, learned, intellectually superior circles to which he naturally belonged, and he had a thoroughly Victorian regard for the merits of "good society." The result was a habit of aloofness in complete contrast with a spontaneous geniality and a warm and affectionate character. This aloofness, though it inevitably weakened his position as a national leader, occasionally gave him some of his great strength. Mr. Jenkins repeats the story of how at a meeting a heckler, with memories of a disturbance during Asquith's Home Secretaryship in which two men were killed, shouted at him: "Why did you murder the miners at Featherstone in '92?" Asquith gave the best possible reply: "It was not '92. It was '93." The episode is very typical of him.

Asquith was a hard worker and a conscientious public servant, but at the same time he was an unusually self-indulgent man. He was a worthy successor to Walpole in maintaining his right to his leisure and his weekends, even in moments of crisis. In early 1914, a vital army order on which Irish destiny hung was held up by his afternoon motor drive!

But the most surprising revelation of self-indulgence in Mr. Jenkins' book concerns his amorous though presumably chaste relations with young women. The most interesting of these was with Miss Venetia Stanley who later became the wife of Asquith's colleague, Edwin Montagu, an event which almost broke Asquith's heart. When they first met in 1912, Asquith was 50 and she was 25. His infatuation was absolute and was expressed in hundreds of letters. Sometimes he sent three on the same day. He told her everything: the latest developments in the political situation, how various ministers were reacting to the events of the day, what the King said at his last audience, his plans for an Irish settlement, his opinions of friends and foes, and when the war came his confidences included military appointments and even troop movements. It says a great deal for Venetia's sense of responsibility that these letters were never the cause of scandal, and the same can be said of her two successors, Lady Scott (widow of the explorer) and Mrs. Harrison.

The tone of the letters is usually frivolous, and a reader can be shocked by this when he reads those which were written against the somber background of July, 1914, but it is a serious mistake to deduce from them that Asquith was a frivolous man. Bernard Shaw, a Puritan in spite of himself, made this mistake. Here the reviewer may note an omission in Mr. Jenkins' book. There is no mention of the caricature of Asquith in his pleasure-loving and philandering role which Bernard Shaw put into *Back to Methusalah*. Surely there must have been some reaction from the Asquith household. The same omission is to be noted in biographies of Bernard Shaw's other victim in the same play, Lloyd George.

Mr. Jenkins has entitled one of his chapters "The Last of the Romans." To describe a man, especially a statesman, as a Roman is to pay him a rare compliment. It is difficult to see why. With the exception of Cicero, it is hard to think of a *Consul Romanus* whose career was not compounded of bloodshed, perfidy and greed, and though Asquith may have erred here and there on the side of self-esteem, he was incapable of Cicero's neurotic conceit. Roman life, even at its best, seems to have been brutal compared to any but the worst of our own. To be the last representative of such a life would be to occupy a dubious position.

However, this is to quarrel pedantically with an accepted phrase. There are better reasons for quarreling if here, as elsewhere, Rome is used as a symbol of any great past from which later generations declined. The years in which Asquith flourished as a politician before World War I are often thought of as a golden age. This book makes it plain that they were nothing of the sort, and the men who led the civilized world were not Titans. The political life of Great Britain in those days was unutterably squalid. What can be said of Asquith is that he was one of the very few in whom inadequacy and untrustworthiness were not manifest. His fall from office in 1916, fairly described here, is a horrible



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story of double-dealing, so much so that disgust obscures the fact that his replacement at this moment was probably a necessity. Even so, Asquith's behavior then compares well with that of most others, and throughout his premiership, judged by the political standards of his time, Asquith gave an example of rectitude.

Only one contemptible act is recorded of his political career: the dismissal in 1915 of Haldane, his oldest friend and another shining exception to the sordid practice of Edwardian political life. The dismissal was required for what we would call McCarthyite reasons: Haldane was well read in German literature and philosophy and was therefore suspected of being a spy! Asquith was forced to get rid of him, and, most regrettably, he did not write or utter a word of regret to his friend. Mr. Jenkins puts this down to Asquith's emotional disturbance at the marriage, at about the same time, of Venetia Stanley, but surely a more likely reason for this cruel neglect was Asquith's utter shame at the depths to which he had been compelled to sink. It can be said that he really was compelled.

How do we see Asquith today? The conservatives who believed him to be a dangerous revolutionary were not quite mistaken. Asquith, the young Winston Churchill, Lloyd George and Haldane among them changed British society, and in so doing influenced the course of Western civilization. From them comes modern capitalist socialism in its present form. The immensity of the changes initiated by the Liberal government was disguised to most eyes by the calm, patrician, dignified figure who presided over this turning point in history. As in 1832, the year of reform, a revolution was accomplished with the absolute minimum of violence. Asquith may not have been a great man, but he was, to be sure, a very valuable one.

ART

Max Kozloff

GIACOMETTI

The difficulty in viewing any large-scale exhibition of Alberto Giacometti, such as the show now at the Museum of Modern Art, is to accommodate oneself to the problem of the one and the many. Every single piece gains credence and potency — the dessicated, saturnine flitch figures he has done since the war, as well as his earlier Surrealist creations—from the company of its fellows. The spectator grows convinced that he is in the presence of a *Vision*. At the same time, the single-mindedness of that vision, its poverty of themes, especially as the work comes closer to the present, expunges the uniqueness and individuality of his sculptures. They begin to seem mechanized concretions of some wholly foreordained and self-convinced scheme of three-dimensional life. Can 200 versions of the same predicament have as much point, or maintain as much impact on the consciousness, as twenty? Even Giacometti's much-touted sense of the impossibility of art has not prevented him from being one of the most prolific poets of agony and uncertainty. Known far and wide as one of the most intensely self-crititcal of artists, he has significantly refused to ration or vary to any extent the production he sends into the world. It is left entirely to his viewers to sort out the high points of an almost animal collision between a painful obsession and a facile execution.

There has always been something very unsatisfying to me about certain premises and aspects of Giacometti. The moral example set by the sobriety of his life, and by his devotion to his craft, has issued in sculptures that are often extraordinarily stylized and mannered. Some of them come close in spirit to the Buffet paintings which so cheaply derive from them. And many of Giacometti's paintings of heads bear a resemblance to such modishly X-rayed cousins as Tchelichew's. About his very abandonment to the mysteries of individual sensations (e.g., the uncertain distance between the tip and the bridge of a nose), there is a quality of self-consciousness—in his work, if not his attitude. In fact, the external dictates of style have dominated his art—as much in the postwar era when it seems to be testing itself by observing visual phenomena, as during its previous shaping of the grand metaphors of experience in Cubism and Surrealism. Perhaps the very minuteness of the distinctions he has been making for the last twenty years, in contour, scaling and surface, has compelled his fixity of stance and predictability of outlook. For all the lavishness of his scrutiny, his bronze figures remain lumpy armatures because, among other things, he has not given himself enough mass to differentiate them. You can diminish your problems so much that you know their solutions ahead of time. Giacometti's precious indecision comes more from his inability to settle for the results of any one sequence among his many operations than it does from the difficulty of implementing the order he desires. The hand is nimble, but the judgment is paralyzed. His linearism, for example, looks either extremely brisk or scribbly—not at all tortured —and in this, his painting and drawings show rather too much relation to the *bijouteries* of Mathieu and Viera da Silva. (Which, incidentally, disproves the myth about his solitude.) But above all, the Expressionist and archaic aura of the Giacomettis since 1945 — they look like Byzantine effigies rumpled with mud —is out of keeping, I think, with an essentially intimist talent.

As presented at the Modern, in a trickily lighted and slightly overcrowded installation, Giacometti's career stands out clearly enough. At his beginning, as a young Swiss doing loose-limbered oil portraits in 1921, and now, as the grand old lion of the Ecole de Paris, he is dominated by the example of Cézanne. The youth follows his master agreeably and academically; the veteran sees in Cézanne not a problem of construction (although this had been a concern of some faceted figure drawings of 1923-4) but a nervousness of contour that might be construed as a device to suggest movement and spatial displacement. Yet it becomes more often a motorized quaver imposing a badly needed energy upon a stick-rigid composition.

Occasionally, in some remarkable drawings ("Vase of Flowers," 1959) or paintings ("The Artist's Mother," 1950), one's gaze is delicately stretched and glued at various translucent planes, demarcated by a wiry or scratchy tracery. As Palma Bucarelli put it: "Space is dangerous . . . it is open to all possibilities; one doesn't know what can happen to him who carelessly enters it. It is like a cobweb: who falls into it is immediately enveloped and kept motionless by thousands of adhesive and flexible threads." It is not, perhaps, the most pleasant feeling, this sense of the

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atmosphere caving in and yet holding on to you at any point of contact. Unlike Cézanne's, works of this kind now seek to confuse the object with a state of mind, or more accurately, a form of agitation. While they can seem garrulous, or overly rhythmic, they are more frequently fragmented, unable to spread out to the margins or to keep huge masses within the field of vision from going out of focus. Possibly nothing more comprehensive could be expected from Giacometti, who becomes fascinated by an eye or a cheek, rather than by the overall tensions of a picture. Though his impulses are graphic, he equates the graphic with the volumetric (some of the heads in his pictures are actually bas-reliefs built up like balls of twine), and tries to compensate for his pictorial sketchiness by exaggerating it as an expressive vehicle.

As to his specific sculptural contributions, Giacometti by the late twenties — and hence prophetically early — had embarked into a wholly Surrealist ambience. Other men, notably Arp, were to insinuate animism into abstract, if amoeboid forms, so that they seem to shimmy by themselves, rather than be vehicles of a represented motion. Giacometti, for his part, was to miniaturize the totemic or Cubist syntax so radically that it demanded to be read as a self-contained landscape, or urban tableau. When it was a question of inventing a single shape, such as the platterlike 1928 "Head," or a unique figure-object metamorphosis, like the concave bronze "Spoon Woman," 1926, nothing much occurred, except a curiously stiff and tight schematism. But on other occasions, reductions of similar images to the status of Lilliputian inhabitants on a plateau, charged the space with an imminence of commuting but irrevocably isolated human forces that had not been seen in European art since the de Chiricos, which might, in fact, have obliquely influenced them ("No More Play," marble, 1933). It was Giacometti's "The Palace at 4 A.M.," also 1933, that sinister doll's house, which transmuted more vitality into American sculpture than even the Picassos and Gonzalezes of the time, and to leave a deep imprint on Smith, Hare, Lassaw, Noguchi and Ernst. Not forms or their echoes but a nightmare of immobility articulated the voids of the composition.

This, perhaps, is the greatest paradox of Giacometti: that he articulates the environment by diminishing as much as possible the mass and restricting the orientation of the elements that occupy space. An irrational process of reverie, rather than physical manipulation of shapes, completes a dimension that would otherwise be lacking. Much has been written (and encouraged by the artist himself) on the sharp break that occurred in his career during the Second World War—as if the succeeding work was a repudiation of the abstract and Surreal in favor of a new humanism. Yet, if we except the tactility of this sculpture as a reversion to the Expressionist side of his teacher, Bourdelle, the change was not so great—especially concerning his literary feeling for space. For one thing, there are outright continuities of subject: "Main Prise," 1932, with "The Hand" of 1947, and the "Pointe à l'oeil" (1931), with "The Nose" of 1947. And the two nudes of 1934-5 are elongated premonitions of things to come. It is all a sign language that Giacometti has worked out to show that limbs can be impaled, or stretched to an absurd degree—but more in demonstration of a fantasy trap than as a response to outer violence or events. (The 1950-1 cage pieces are an effective display of this spirit—they go back to the "Palace"—while at the same time they embody a nice sense of the theatre.) But what essentially had happened was the displacement of his various erotic or castration ironies and condensations by a heroically pictorial mold which nevertheless retained their underlying anatomy. In one sense, this was a regression to the Rodin tradition; but on another level, it was a sharing of the contemporary urge for that heightened surface activity which had engulfed painting.

It would have been interesting to report that Giacometti had become the Abstract-Expressionist sculptor par excellence, for neither his development nor his concentration on the figure were out of phase with that moment. Unfortunately, his attempt to pierce a delusion about the unfamiliarity of all faces and figures was out of phase. Given the hypotheses of his art up to then, the naturalism which he now wanted to impose upon his vision was indeed impossible. There emerged a war between the conceptual and the sensorial, in which the former won, but not before being uprooted from the whole formally nourishing environment of modern art, which Giacometti, among others, had enjoyed prior to 1939 (and which has not given sign of reviving since). Suddenly, everything becomes preposterously difficult for him, and the most trivial verification of a point or plane in space slips beyond his grasp. It is the material—the clay—which now pays the price by being clawed into shriveled or gummy tatters. Worse still, far from being some newly felt equivalent of optical data, it registers that tiresome anguish, that intimation of death and destruction, which is far more explicit and illustrational than he would ever have permitted in the past. Before this dilemma, his sensitivity softens, and washes timidly around what are sometimes striking, but more often, vacant ciphers. And after all his experience, the final retreat back to Cézanne is too late and misconceived. What stand out in the end are some very poignant vignettes in drawing and sculpture, of city men and women, walking in a square—poignant because their disorientation reflects some of Giacometti's own.

As written by Peter Selz (who is also the director of the show) the catalogue note is a model of ad copy and cultural rhetoric.



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SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Continued from page 702)

for revolution, at which time the change will occur by spontaneous combustion, needing no outside help, except sympathy and perhaps material aid. Preparation of the revolution must be undertaken by the native Communist party; it can get advice, technical assistance and counsel from established Communist regimes, but should not rely on their armed forces to intervene. In practice this doctrine works out in a modified form of the domino theory. Successful revolution is a model which others should study and copy when applicable. China is the model. Similar conditions must produce similar results; most (though not all) of Southeast Asia has a social structure and a backward economy in broad aspects very like that of Nationalist China. Therefore the fire once kindled ought to spread in such dry grass.

The weakness of such a theory, if indeed it is held in the Chinese leadership, is that it also takes too little account of nationalism, and in particular of local nationalism. It tends to emphasize the struggle with the West, above all with the United States, and to ignore the internecine feuds of the Southeast Asian states. Communists should believe that once the people are in power such quarrels lose their meaning: the real quarrel in any country is with the exploiting classes. It may be that the Communist leadership in eastern Asia does so believe, but as long as communism can enlist nationalism in its struggle against the West, the belief in the ultimate mutual harmony of people's democracies is irrelevant; no such governments are yet in power throughout the territories of the countries concerned.

If this Communist version of the domino theory is in fact held, it is clearly not entirely relied upon. The Communists do not in practice wait for the fall of one to involve the collapse of the rest. On the contrary, they try to advance on all fronts, to promote and prepare revolution in many different countries —all those that are deemed "ripe." These certainly include Indonesia, Malaysia at a second stage, and possibly Thailand also; while Cambodia, ruled by its popular uncrowned king who courts the favor of China, is far down the list. It should therefore be Communist strategy to encourage the West to follow policies based on the domino theory. The more effort and strength is put into Vietnam, the less interest and attention will be paid to Indonesia — or Malaysia. Then if the revolution ripens to combustion point in these countries of the south, Vietnam will be isolated, the flank and rear turned. Whether Vietnam falls or stands will be relatively insignificant if Indonesia becomes a fully Communist-controlled state.

The main hindrance to such Communist policies is precisely the local nationalism of the peoples of the countries themselves. Confrontation with Malaysia may at present suit the Indonesian Communist party and receive the approval of Peking. But what if it were to succeed, and Malaysia should be, in President Sukarno's favorite phrase, "crushed"? What is crushed breaks up, and the disposal of the pieces would not be an easy or agreeable task for the Communist leaders. Sarawak contains a one-third Chinese population, rather left wing in politics, which certainly cherished the hope of running North Borneo had Malaysia not been formed. Peking would find it difficult to deny such aspirations if Malaysia were dismembered, and they could suit Peking very well; but Indonesia might find such a settlement distasteful. Singapore is 80 per cent Chinese, and if Malaysia breaks up, the present rulers of Singapore, the P.A.P. (People's Action Party), believe that they would be displaced by a crypto or even an overt Communist government. Malaya itself has a 40 per cent Chinese minority, which is economically the strength and core of the country. The break-up of Malaysia would place this community at hazard. It formerly provided the minority group which formed the Malayan Communist party. It is certain that it fears Malay domination, which union with Indonesia would reinforce. A conflict between a new Malayan Chinese Communist party, with far larger support than the former insurrection ever commanded, and the Malay-Indonesian community would seem more than probable. The complexity of local rivalries, racial, religious and political, would be greatly increased by the crushing of Malaysia—and there would no longer be a foreign "imperialist" presence to put the blame upon.

The Chinese will certainly be aware of these problems, for nowhere is their information likely to be better than in Malaysia; how they see them, what remedies they would apply, what short-term policies in preparation for more long-term aims, cannot be surmised. Yet it must be remembered that this area is the region adjacent to China, in which its influence through the centuries has always been present, sometimes powerful and active, at other times dormant, but by the mere facts of geography, never extinct. China will always be there—under whatever regime, swayed by whatever ideology—at all times the actual or potential great power most intimately concerned, with the most local knowledge, and the best local contacts. To ignore this massive and unalterable fact seems at present to be the main weakness of Western policy. To some observers on this side of the world it appears to be a very dangerous and possibly fatal error.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1112

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Fooling around with what a beast of burden is good for? (8, 2)
6 Is the boss game for it? (4)
10 When the van retreats and the rear breaks in confusion, what a spot to be in! (7)
11 One might be dispatched on them, and doesn't do right about it. (7)
12 Auditors should be within reach of it, when they get hot. (4)
13 One might swear a variety of amber helps to make it! (10)
15 People of the wrong set, born to be straightened out! (7)
16 Throw into disorder. (7)
17 And possibly more disorder in play. (7)
20 It's nothing to an automobile in a rather crude instrumental form.
22 Would such faddists object to margarine in the ice cream? (10)
23 If such an etherial type had scope, it might help view things properly, on the surface. (4)
25 Halt everything returning in the plate. (7)
26 Gray type of verse? Not really.
27 What one might put down in the 3 with a cool drink, perhaps. (4)
28 The extent to which Browning might go? One hopes not to miss things here. (5, 5)

DOWN:

1 Could they tell when the pilgrims approached, or were they just part of the plot? (10, 5)
2 and 24 What the cleric sometimes does might help the drive in one way. (7, 4)
3 Several feet fenced in, possibly.
4 They might fit in case the requirement is with the French. (7)
5 Al fresco, to eat as one throws the doors wide. (5, 2)
7 This South American bird could be made out around the main way.
8 The answer to such a challenge might be "Well, for one thing, it's round." (8, 1, 6)
9 You can't say such legends wouldn't make you turn a hair!
14 The operatic name for Othello, and confused with sculptor. (9)
18 Certainly not placid and mute when disturbed. (7)
19 With the capital of Nevada, they might be enabling people. (7)
20 Certainly doesn't go in to buy. (The most popular items should, compared to the rest.) (7)
21 Spanish-Portuguese? (7)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1111

ACROSS: 1 and 5 Benedict Arnold; 10 Outer; 11 Operation; 12 Earnest; 13 Athwart; 14 and 27 Off to a good start; 15 Mission; 18 Pattens; 21 Visits; 24 Inducts; 26 Cruiser; 29 Reside; 30 Adherent. DOWN: 1 Broken; 2 Net profit; 3 Darkest; 4 Croatia; 6 Reaches; 7 and 28 Ouija board; 8 Donating; 9 Becalm; 16 Intestate; 17 Springer; 19 Encased; 20 Sashay; 21 Vacated; 22 Stumble; 23 Credit; 25 Drops.

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